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ABSTRACT 
This study attempted to explore how nonprofit and government organizations 
conceptualize disaster response effectiveness using an internet survey.  Unfortunately, the data 
collected through this method was insufficient for meaningful data analysis, and, therefore this 
study was unable to generate significant findings with respect to its research question.  Thus, 
rather than focusing on a presentation of results from data collection and interpreting the 
significance of those results, this thesis focuses on justification of the need for research on this 
topic, review of the literature that suggests it is likely that nonprofits and government perceive 
disaster response effectiveness differently, recounting of the initial data collection efforts 
undertaken and the problems encountered, offering of hypotheses for future testing based on 
analysis of the flawed data, and recommendation of an alternate data collection method that 
should be used in the future. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
This study attempted to explore how local nonprofits and emergency management 
relevant government organizations conceptualize “disaster response effectiveness”.  Specifically, 
the study addressed the following research question: 
How do nonprofits and emergency management relevant government organizations 
conceptualize the terms disaster, response, and effectiveness? 
Background 
This background section establishes that dealing with the aftermath of disasters is 
complex.  Nonprofits have been a consistent provider of relief after disasters from early in 
American history while government’s role in disasters has evolved, slowly expanding over time.  
As government’s role has expanded, it has sought to increase the effectiveness of how disasters 
are managed and actively sought improvement in the coordination among the entities involved.  
Yet, government has not, until very recently, actively engaged with nonprofits.  The section also 
shows that there is now interest in learning about these groups and exploring what is needed to 
coordinate among them.  The discussion suggests that a helpful basis for figuring out a 
coordination system that includes nonprofits is based on an understanding of how both groups—
nonprofits and government—conceptualize the events and activities in which they engage.  
Specifically, knowledge of what nonprofits and government think a disaster is, what each thinks 
responding to a disaster means, and how each understands when it has been effective would 
provide an empirical basis upon which to build an effective coordination system.  
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Complexity of Dealing with Disasters 
There exists no agreed upon definition for what constitutes a disaster among scholars or 
practitioners (see for example: Dombrowsky, 1995; Gilbert, 1995; Hewitt, 1995; Kroll-Smith & 
Couch, 1991; National Research Council, 2006; Perry, 2007; Porfiriev, 1995; Quarantelli, 2005).  
Scholars differ as to whether the events under discussion must be intended or unintended or 
planned or unplanned events (Dombrowsky, 2005); whether qualitative or quantitative factors 
matter more (Perry, 2005; Quarantelli, 2005); the terms used to describe the event (e.g., disaster, 
crisis, hazard etc.) (Alexander, 2005; Barton, 2005; Britton, 2005); whether the systems that are 
impacted by the event include social, political and/or natural (see for example; Cutter, 2005; 
Stallings, 2005; Smith, 2005); and, more.  The debate still rages on despite recognition within 
disaster scholarship that a shared understanding of the concept of “disaster” is critical (Buckle, 
2005).  Currently, no consensus-backed operational definition of disaster exists.  There are, 
however, some common characteristics that are associated with descriptions of disaster events.  
These characteristics are not related to numbers of things (e.g., deaths, injuries, properties lost, 
businesses impacted, infrastructure damaged or destroyed); rather, they are related to qualitative 
features of the post-disaster environment such as who is involved in these kinds of events and 
how they are handled. 
 Dealing with the consequences of disasters is complicated.  The characteristics of a 
hazard, hazard event, and pre-existing vulnerabilities interact to produce any variety of impacts 
(National Research Council, 2006).  The impacts lead to any number and combination of needs 
on the part of individuals and households, businesses, government, and nonprofits, the built 
environment, the natural environment, etcetera (National Research Council, 2006).  Depending 
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on the nature of the disaster’s impacts, a variety of entities become involved in addressing the 
needs (Auf der Heide, 1989; Drabek et al., 1981; Lewis, 1988).  From the local level, these 
entities can include individuals and households in the impacted area, businesses (e.g., 
contractors, emergency medical services), nonprofit organizations, government agencies (e.g., 
fire department, law enforcement, public works, elected officials), and government agencies 
from jurisdictions surrounding the impacted jurisdiction.  
Some impacted communities may have had previous experience with disasters and some 
may not have (Auf der Heide, 1989).  Some of the impacted communities may have planned to 
engage in the aftermath of disasters and some may not have (at least not to the degree necessary) 
(Auf der Heide, 1989; Drabek et al., 1981).  Regardless, all find that despite any preparedness 
efforts the needs related to a disaster exceeds their capacity (Auf der Heide, 1989). 
Depending on disaster related-needs and the capacity and capability of local communities 
to adequately address them, additional entities from outside the impacted community may also 
assist (Auf der Heide, 1989; Drabek et al., 1981).  These entities can include individuals and 
households from outside the area who volunteer spontaneously, national level businesses and 
nonprofits, and any number of government agencies from the state and federal level.  Each of the 
entities may have individual perspectives and goals, resources, organizational structures, and 
preferred methods of assisting impacted communities (Auf der Heide, 1989; Drabek et al., 1981). 
Further complicating matters, each of the entities may become involved in helping communities 
at various points in time after disasters (e.g., immediately before, during, and after the event 
when lifesaving activities and activities to preserve property and the environment are carried out, 
in the initial weeks and months following the event when basic services are restored, roadways 
are cleared, temporary housing is devised, etcetera, or in the period when the social, built, 
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physical environments are reshaped, restored, and/or rebuilt) (Lewis, 1988; Smith, 2011).  
Moreover, these entities once involved may stay so for various lengths of time (Lewis, 1988; 
Smith, 2011).  
Due to the urgency of the situation, sheer number of needs to be met, and entities 
involved (with their varying ways of viewing and doing things), some shared manner of 
coordination (e.g., structures, processes) among them is desirable (Auf der Heide, 1989).  Also 
desirable is clarity and shared understanding among the entities involved about goals and 
priorities in the aftermath of disasters, which entities will fulfill which roles, under what 
conditions, at what times and for what length of time, to/for whom, toward what end, with what, 
and how the effectiveness of their participation will be determined much less the effectiveness of 
the overall effort to meet disaster-related needs (Auf der Heide, 1989).  Pursuit of such 
coordination in the United States has been slow in coming (Schroeder, Wamsley, & Ward, 2001) 
and efforts have met with varying levels of success at various times and in various places 
(Comfort, 1988; Drabek, 1985).  
A Brief History of How Disasters Have Been Dealt within the United States 
Disasters have occurred throughout United States history.  In fact, even prior to the 
nineteenth century the United States experienced a significant number of major disasters (Rubin, 
2007).  Yet, developing a coordinated way of dealing with disasters that synchronized the efforts 
of involved entities was not only not attempted it was not even considered.  Explanations for 
why coordination efforts have been slow in coming in the United States include how disasters 
were perceived, who was thought to be responsible for dealing with them, and how disaster-
related needs were addressed early in the country’s history.  
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Early in the history of the United States, disasters were perceived as unavoidable “acts of 
God” (Fischer, 1998) that transcended the power of government to prevent (Rubin, 2007, p.12).  
Responsibility for dealing with disasters was considered a local concern; thus, the federal 
government only stepped in after the event in the most extreme cases (Miller, 2009).  State 
governments assisted local governments when and where they could (Rubin, 2007).  Disaster 
assistance for individuals and households was viewed as the moral responsibility of churches, 
neighbors, and charities but not the government (Platt, 1999).  Any efforts by the government to 
provide relief to communities impacted by disasters were reactive, ad hoc, uncoordinated, 
provided well after disasters occurred, and often focused primarily on the needs of government 
(e.g., rebuilding public facilities) (Platt, 1999; Rubin, 2007).  The degree to which government 
was involved was determined case-by-case and often on the basis of precedent (Rubin, 2007). 
Thus, local communities were typically left to their own devices in dealing with disasters and kin 
and neighbors did what they could to address the needs of those impacted while local 
governments attempted to address needs related to infrastructure, public facilities, and the 
economy. 
Nonprofits such as the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army and other organizations 
were the earliest providers of formal relief that assisted impacted communities (see for example: 
Fischer, 1998; Popkin, 1978; Rubin, 2007; Ott, 2001).  From the outset of their involvement, 
they attempted to fill the gaps left by survivors, kin, neighbors, churches, and government and 
address the needs of individuals and households to the degree they could (Kreps, 1990; Pipa, 
2006).  They have provided a range of vital services (De Vita & Cramer, 2008) and acted as 
advocates for victims (Boris & Steuerle, 2006b). Yet, despite their early involvement in 
disasters, significant attempts to coordinate among the nonprofits involved were not made much 
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less efforts to coordinate across all of the entities that became involved in the aftermath of 
disasters at various times (Rubin, 2007). 
As the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, the number of disasters occurring, 
their magnitude, and the number of people and communities impacted increased (Rubin, 2007).  
The public’s expectations of government also began to expand (Rubin, 2007).  And, 
government’s involvement in disasters gradually grew, particularly the involvement of the 
federal government which began providing assistance to state and local governments for an 
increasing number of disasters (Miller, 2009).  Yet, even though government was increasingly 
involved in providing relief after disasters along with survivors, neighbors, churches, and 
nonprofits, there was no effort to develop a formal system to coordinate their efforts.  
In the late 1940s, the federal government began to see the costs associated with a lack of 
coordination both in the assistance offered by the federal government and its interactions with 
the entities involved in the aftermath of disasters at all levels.  Thus, the federal government 
began a series of attempts to coordinate disaster assistance.  For instance, the Federal Disaster 
Assistance Act of 1950 was passed in an attempt to formalize and standardize provision of 
federal disaster relief (Rubin, 2007).  This legislation also articulated that the primary 
responsibility for natural and human-caused disasters lay with local and state government and 
that the federal government’s role was only supplemental (Rubin, 2007).  Following this 
legislation, there was an increase in government involvement in disasters and more government 
assistance was available to impacted communities.  And, the Civil Defense Act of 1950 was 
passed to support the development of state and local civil defense offices and plans to deal with 
the consequences of a potential domestic (possibly nuclear) attack (Quarantelli, 2000). Yet, this 
evolution of the government’s role in disasters addressed the provision of aid and coordination 
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issues related to government and overlooked the role of all of the entities that had historically 
been the primary providers of relief—survivors, neighbors, kin, churches, and, the most formal 
of relief providers—nonprofits. 
As the twentieth century progressed, the federal government continued its efforts to 
coordinate how disaster needs were addressed.  A number of grant programs were created and 
funded to support state and local preparedness in addition to the funding that was already being 
provided after disasters through the Federal Disaster Assistance Act.  In 1979, at the urging of 
state and local leaders and following several major disasters, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) was created (Miller, 2009).  FEMA was intended to advance 
disaster management by addressing tasks related to response, recovery, mitigation, and 
preparedness as well as coordinating the activities among federal state, and local governments 
(Kreps, 1990; Miller, 2009; Rubin, 2007).  Federal leadership (and the provision of 
accompanying resources) resulted in increased attention to preparedness for disasters at the state 
and local government levels (Rubin, 2007).  Still, entities outside of government were largely 
overlooked despite their continuing involvement in the aftermath of disasters (Rubin, 2007).  
The federal government has continued its attempts to formalize and standardize a system 
of coordination for managing disasters.  For instance, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, the Department of Homeland Security was created to address terrorist threats and 
consolidate and coordinate federal efforts related to disasters (Miller, 2009); and, the National 
Response Plan (NRP) and National Incident Management System (NIMS) were developed to 
bring about a standardized nationwide system for addressing disaster needs at the local, state, and 
federal levels (Rubin, 2007).  However, the new system caused significant complications at the 
state and local levels by establishing barriers between formal response system and the informal 
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network that had historically formed at the local level to respond to disaster (Rubin, 2007).  The 
federal government’s attempt to standardize how disasters were managed was tested in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  
A significant body of literature has suggested that government’s reaction to Hurricane 
Katrina was uncoordinated, slow, inadequate, and did not successfully integrate nonprofits and 
businesses into government efforts (see for example: Boris & Steuerle, 2006b; Canclini et al., 
2009; De Vita & Kramer, 2008; Pipa, 2006; Rubin, 2007; Simo & Bies, 2007).  In stark contrast, 
the involvement of nonprofits has been lauded and highly publicized (see for example: Boris & 
Steuerle, 2006b; Brennan et al., 2007; De Vita & Kramer, 2008; Kapucu, 2007; Pipa, 2006; Simo 
& Bies, 2007; Torrey et al., 2007).  Most of the problems that have been noted regarding 
nonprofit involvement in Katrina revolve around coordination issues—related to structures and 
processes to coordinate efforts among nonprofits themselves as well as with government and the 
basic issues of shared understandings of who does what, when, where, why, under what 
conditions, for what length of time, etcetera (De Vita & Cramer, 2008; Fagnoni, 2006; Gajewski 
et al., 2010; Pipa, 2006; Schneider, 2005).  As Boris and Steuerle (2006a) emphasized, it took a 
large-scale disaster such as Hurricane Katrina to reveal the weakness of how disasters are 
managed in the United States for all to see.  And, it would appear from scholarly discussion (e.g., 
Comfort, 2006; Howitt and Leonard, 2006; Waugh & Streib, 2006), government reports (e.g., 
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 
Katrina, 2006; Townsend, 2006), and popular books (e.g., Brinkley, 2006; Cooper & Block, 
2006; McQuaid & Schleifstein, 2006; van Heerden & Bryan, 2006) that one of the primary 
problems in meeting the needs from Hurricane Katrina was a lack of coordination.   
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The federal, state, and local governments are now paying increasing attention to 
coordination issues—not just within government but also across all of the entities involved after 
disasters.  A number of changes have been made to federal policy and law (Bea et al., 2006) and 
the federal government has made multiple revisions to plans and various coordination 
mechanisms to include a wider range of the entities involved in response (e.g., FEMA, 2008a, b; 
FEMA, 2011).  These efforts have not been easy.  As stated by Waugh and Tierney (2007), 
“Integrating volunteer organizations, faith-based organizations, for-profit organizations and 
others into one unified effort can be a monumental task.  Poor cultural interoperability 
complicates multi-organizational, intergovernmental, and inter-sector operations” (p. 329).  It 
would seem, however, that these efforts were undertaken without a critical first step—an 
exploration and acknowledgement of how the different entities engaged in disaster 
management—in this case nonprofits and government—view the events, tasks, and success 
associated with their involvement.  As will be demonstrated in the literature review chapter to 
follow, there are many differences among government and nonprofits in general and specific to 
their involvement in disasters that suggest they may conceptualize disasters, the response to 
them, and response effectiveness differently.   
Significance 
 The aftermath of disasters has been researched for decades.  We know a lot about what 
needs are commonly seen and what seems to help things work better or worse after disasters.  
We know a lot about who is involved and what they do.  What we do not know, and what has not 
been explored through research are three simple issues:  a) What is it that characterizes the 
events in which nonprofits and government are involved?  b) To what extent are each involved at 
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different times in the life of an event? and c) How is it that each knows if it has been successful, 
or effective, in helping to meet the needs of the event?   
 This study hoped to contribute to emergency management practice by identifying the 
extent to which nonprofits and government view these issues similarly, articulating where 
differences exist, and suggesting the possible implications of their views for efforts to develop 
coordination systems for the aftermath of disasters.  Waugh and Tierney (2007) would agree that 
a study of this nature would be of value since“…tools [are needed] to facilitate coordination and 
collaboration with organizations and entities whose structures and decision-making processes 
differ from their own” (p. 328).   
 This study also stood to contribute to the emergency management discipline.  As the 
discipline that studies “how human beings create, interact, and cope with hazards, vulnerabilities, 
and associated events particularly through activities related to preparedness, response, recovery, 
and mitigation” (Jensen, 2010, p. 19), the issue of how disaster response effectiveness is defined 
is of inherent interest.  By beginning to fill a gap in the literature on this topic this study was 
designed to provide important data that could be used for the development of emergency 
management theory and future research as well as in the education of students studying the 
aftermath of disasters. 
 Unfortunately, this study did not result in the potential contributions identified.  Data 
collection efforts to explore this topic met with little success; and, the data that resulted from 
these efforts was insufficient for the type of analysis the researcher intended.  Although this 
study was not able to contribute in as significant a way as she might have hoped, it makes the 
following contributions.  First, the present study provides a thorough review of the literature 
highlighting the many and key differences between nonprofits and government organizations. 
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These differences are so significant they may very well influence the way each type of 
organization views basic concepts such as disaster, response, and response effectiveness in 
different ways.  The full nature and extent of the anticipated differences in understandings of 
these concepts awaits the data the present study had hoped to collect, but this study’s literature 
review clearly highlights the potential for these differences, and, given the coordination problem 
in disaster response, resolution of these differences is critical.  Second, the present study’s data 
collection challenges are detailed for the benefit of future researchers along with suggested 
solutions.  Third, the results of a superficial analysis of the data collected are shared and 
hypotheses of what future research exploring the topic may find are provided.  Thus, this thesis 
offers both substantive and methodological insights pertinent to a key concern—disaster 
response effectiveness.  
Conclusion 
Chapter Two reviews the literature suggesting that nonprofits and government may very 
well conceptualize disaster, response, and effectiveness differently.  After Chapter Two, this 
document departs from the typical thesis format where results are presented and implications of 
those results are discussed.  Instead, the remainder of the document revolves around the attempt 
made to study this topic, what went wrong, and what can be done to study this topic in the future. 
Thus, Chapter Three presents what the researcher did to collect data related to her research 
question.  Chapter Four describes the intended data analysis technique the researcher was going 
to use to analyze her data and why she was unable to do so; and, the Fifth Chapter makes 
suggestions for future research on this topic.  Chapter Six presents a superficial analysis of the 
data and hypotheses for future testing.  Chapter Seven provides a summary and conclusion for 
this project. 
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 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review discusses the differences between nonprofits and government 
organizations and suggests that these differences may impact their conceptualizations of disaster 
response effectiveness.  Review of the organizational literature reveals differences in the day-to-
day orientation, power structure, financial stability, and organizational culture of these two types 
of organizations.  And, the disaster literature shows that these differences also appear in the 
involvement of these types of organizations in disaster.  Based on a review of these two bodies of 
literature, it is reasonable to think that the differences between nonprofit and government 
agencies may have consequences for their conceptualization of disaster response effectiveness.   
Differences between Nonprofits and Government in Organizational Literature 
The nonprofit sector in the United States is dynamic and has grown significantly in recent 
decades (Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; Rubin, 2007; Salamon, 1999; Tierney et al., 2001; Ott, 2001; 
Wolf, 1999).  However, differences within the sector make it difficult to define and describe it as 
a whole (Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; Eisner, 2010; Wolf, 1999).  Nonprofits vary from one to the 
next in their mission, organizational structure and staffing, size, sources of revenue, and financial 
status (see for example: Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; Block, 2001; Eisner, 2010; Ott, 2001; Wolf, 
1999).  In fact, they vary so much that some observers question whether it is appropriate to lump 
nonprofits together and speak of them together as a “sector” (Salamon, 1999).   
Despite the complexity and diversity of the “sector”, there are a few characteristics that 
unify nonprofits.  For instance, to be considered a nonprofit the organization must be self-
governing, incorporated under federal and state law as a charitable or not-for-profit corporation, 
and have a mission that is dedicated to serving the public good in some way (see for example, 
Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; Eisner, 2010; Ott, 2001; Popkin, 1978; Rubin, 2007; Salamon, 1999; 
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Smith, 1978; Spillan, 2003; Tierney et al., 2001; Wolf, 1999).  Ott (2001) would argue that there 
are additional characteristics common to nonprofits such as the fact that they receive significant 
support from voluntary contributions of time, effort, and money and have organizational cultures 
that are based on beliefs, values, and basic assumptions associated with voluntary participation.   
Nonprofits are not the only sector actively involved in the provision of various services to 
the public and addressing societal problems – government does too (Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; 
Salamon, 1999; Wolf, 1999).  For instance, nonprofits and government are involved in the arts, 
culture, education and research, environment and recreation, as well as promoting health, 
preventing diseases, providing clothing, food and shelter, and providing spiritual care among 
many other services (see for example: Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; Salamon, 1999; Ott, 2001; Pipa, 
2006; Wolf, 1999).  Despite the fact that nonprofits and government agencies perform similar 
activities in serving the public, they are dissimilar in many other ways (Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; 
Ott, 2001; Popkin, 1978; Wolf, 1999).  There are several key characteristics that distinguish 
nonprofits and government, including their day-to-day orientations, power structure, financial 
stability, and organizational culture.  
 The day-to-day orientation of nonprofits and government organizations is different. 
Meeting the needs of the constituencies associated with the organization is more important for 
nonprofits than meeting other organizational goals (Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; Wolf, 1999).  Ott 
(2001) noted that nonprofits exist as long as they satisfy constituencies and the constituencies 
perceive that they are benefitting from the organization’s activities.  Their goals (insofar as they 
have them) fluctuate with the needs (Smith, 1978) and interest (Ott, 2001) of the constituencies 
associated with the organization.  In contrast, government has been described as comprised of 
bureaucratic, goal-oriented, and instrumental organizations whose primary purpose is to 
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accomplish their goals and objectives regardless of the degree to which the goals and objectives 
meet public needs (Ott, 2001).  Thus, nonprofits are naturally less interested in issues of 
performance, efficiency, budget, and accountability than government.  The different day-to-day 
orientations of nonprofits and government may lead them to conceptualize the notion of 
effectiveness of disaster response differently.   
The authority relationship within nonprofit and government organizations is also 
dissimilar.  For instance, government agencies are organized hierarchically and employees are 
under the control of higher administrative or political authority (Ott, 2001).  The government is 
relatively centralized (at each level) and decisions made by top administrative and/or elected 
officials determine what is done.  How decisions are implemented within government is often 
determined by law, regulation, policy and/or ordinance (Sylves, 2009).  Unlike government, the 
“business” of nonprofits is not determined or carried out in accordance with a hierarchical 
structure and the power structure between nonprofit boards, other outside stakeholders, clients, 
staff, and volunteers is not hierarchically organized (Ott, 2001).  While nonprofits typically have 
a board of directors, its main function is developing strategic plans and identifying goals.  The 
board typically does not speak for the organization or compel action within the organization (Ott, 
2001).  This difference in power structure between nonprofits and government may also 
influence how each approaches their involvement in disaster, how each thinks about disaster 
response effectiveness, and how effectiveness is achieved.  
Another critical difference between nonprofits and government that may influence 
disaster engagement is the financial stability of each type of organization.  The financial 
foundation of nonprofits tends to be unstable and insecure (see for example: Boris & Steuerle, 
2006a; Ott, 2001; Salamon, 1999; Wolf, 1999).  Nonprofits typically cobble together a financial 
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foundation for the organization that includes grants, fees for services, contracts, and/or 
donations.  Yet, the amount of donations received is not constant and fluctuates with publicity 
received by the organization, public interest in the mission of the organization, and the state of 
the economy (Block, 2001).  Grants are unreliable in that, regardless of source (e.g., government 
grant, foundation grant, etc.), they tend to be time-bound with funds supplied for only a limited 
period of time (Block, 2001).  As the amount of funds and source of funding coming into a 
nonprofit ebb and flow, the nonprofit is forced to constantly negotiate its financial survival.  
Nonprofits spend considerable time on related efforts (Coppola, 2011).  As Coppola, (2011) 
stated, “because NGOs depend on outside funding for their operations, they must spend a 
significant amount of effort on public relations, fundraising, and outreach” (p.390).  Securing 
funding sources is a competitive endeavor often pitting one nonprofit against another for a 
contract or grant (Coppola, 2011).  Because of these issues, the financial foundation of two 
nonprofits is never the same and changes over time (Coppola, 2011, p.392).   
On the other hand, government agencies have long-term programs, in large part, due to 
their financial stability.  Once government bureaucracies are created, it is rare that they are 
eliminated entirely (Sylves, 2009).  The funding for government organizations is allocated 
through a pre-determined periodic process.  Changes to funding levels are the result of 
discussion, and there is typically significant forewarning if there are to be budget cuts that impact 
any one government entity or entities.  Thus, government and nonprofits have quite different 
financial foundations, and those foundations may very well impact the way they view disaster 
response effectiveness.   
Organizational culture is yet another important distinction between nonprofits and 
government that may influence the way each views the topic of this study.  The organizational 
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culture of nonprofits is based on beliefs, values, and basic assumptions associated with voluntary 
participation (Ott, 2001).  The culture is also based on like-minded individuals who are 
associated with the organization (Coppola, 2007).  This “like-mindedness” stems from the fact 
that nonprofits attract individuals who are motivated to work for the organization because of 
belief in the organization’s mission and the activities in which it engages (Coppola, 2007; Kelly, 
1988; Ott, 2001).  Government agencies do not have “like-mindedness” similar to nonprofit 
organizations. But, the cultural differences between nonprofits and government only begin here – 
there are many others.  Listing a few additional differences, Ott (2001) stated,  
… [nonprofits] seldom operate, feel, or act like government agencies.  Key actors 
do not relate to each other or to the organization in the same ways… things 
usually do not get done in the same ways, people and groups do not fill similar 
roles, possess similar power, or share the same service – or bureaucracy related 
values (p. 288). 
  
Thus, the organizational literature suggests that cultural differences in addition to those 
associated with financial stability, power structure, and day-to-day orientations may each 
influence how government and nonprofits conceptualize disaster response effectiveness.   
Similar to the organizational literature, the disaster literature also suggests that there are 
critical differences between nonprofits and government including their structure and functions 
during disaster, their missions and goals, and their human and physical capacity.   And, this 
literature provides reason to believe these differences may impact their perceptions related to the 
topic of research for this study. 
Differences between Nonprofits and Government Articulated in the Disaster Literature 
The aftermath of disaster involves individuals and various organizations that span the 
public and private sectors including fire services, emergency medical services, public works 
departments, law enforcement, nonprofits, businesses, religious congregations, communities, 
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volunteers, and many other small groups who provide vital services to disaster victims (see for 
example: Auf der Heide, 1989; Boris & Steuerle, 2006a, 2006b; De Vita & Kramer, 2008; 
Drabek, 1983; Popkin, 1978; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977; Rubin, 2007; Tierney et al., 2001).  
The Disaster Research Center (DRC) developed a typology that helps us to better understand the 
various organizations that provide relief.  The typology separates all of the organizations and 
entities involved with disaster into one of four categories of groups including established, 
expanding, extending, or emerging groups (Dynes, 1970; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977; Scanlon, 
1999).   
All four of these groups are actively engaged in disaster relief activities (see for example: 
Dynes, 1970; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977; Scanlon, 1999; Tierney et al., 2001).  Yet, the 
typology suggests that these categories of groups differ in the specific tasks in which they engage 
and their human and physical capacities (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977).  Government tends to fit 
in what the DRC typology would call the category of established groups.  Nonprofits tend to fit 
in the categories of extending or expanding groups.  The following discussion will focus on the 
categories of groups to which government and nonprofits tend to belong.    
According to Quarantelli and Dynes (1977), established groups are complex 
organizations such as police and fire departments, general hospitals, and public utility 
companies.  The established groups have manifest emergency functions and are expected to be 
involved in emergencies and disasters.  They tend to carry out their day-to-day tasks  with 
relatively small changes—even during disasters (see for example: Kennedy et al., 1969; 
Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977; Quarantelli et al., 1966; Wenger et al., 1989).  For instance, police 
and fire departments might be forced to engage in search and rescue but revert back as quickly as 
possible to their regular work (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977).  They usually function the same way 
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in both the pre-disaster and emergency period (Auf der Heide, 1989; Kennedy et al., 1969; 
Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977).  
On the other hand, expanding groups tend to be nonprofits such as Red Cross chapters, 
Salvation Army units, and other community and faith-based or secular organizations (see for 
example: Dynes, 1970; Scanlon, 1999; Smith, 1978).  Expanding groups have what is described 
as a “latent emergency function” meaning that while they have no disaster related day-to-day 
mission these types of groups are expected to be active during disasters and provide critical 
services to survivors (Dynes, 1970).  These kinds of organizations and the jurisdictions in which 
they are located intend for the organizations to be involved despite the fact that their disaster 
function is different from their day-to-day activities, often bearing no resemblance (Quarantelli 
et al., 1966).  For instance, an organization like the Salvation Army that offers a variety of 
programs serving youth, the homeless, the elderly expands its services beyond these day-to-day 
programs to assist victims through collecting and distributing essential needs, opening shelters, 
and providing spiritual counseling as well as many other health and human services after a 
disaster (see for example: Boris & Steuerle, 2006a, 2006b; De Vita & Kramer, 2008; Eisner, 
2010; Smith, 1978; Kapucu, 2003; Pipa, 2006).   
Unlike expanding groups, extending groups have no manifest or latent function related to 
disasters.  Extending groups include churches, social groups, and recreational groups that have 
no regular tasks associated with disasters in routine or disaster times but find themselves 
extending beyond their normal mission to assist.  Members of both expanding and extending 
groups often lack skills and experience to carry out emergency functions.  
In addition to organizational functions, the groups involved in the aftermath of disasters 
are dissimilar in their organizational structures.  The structure of each group dictates to a large 
 19 
extent how their members will act in their position in the organization (Quarantelli & Dynes, 
1977).  Established groups are highly bureaucratic in structure and tend to have a clear-cut line 
of authority and explicit decision-making processes even at the times of disaster (see for 
example: Auf der Heide, 1989; Dynes, 1970; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977; Scanlon, 1999; Ott, 
2001).  Nevertheless, internal structural rearrangements such as decision-making at lower levels 
of the hierarchy may occur during hazard events (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977).   
Unlike established groups, the internal structure and external relations of expanding 
groups change extensively at the time of disaster (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977; Scanlon, 1999).  
Their size expands as volunteers and/or new members join the organization to help fulfill their 
latent disaster functions (Quarantelli et al., 1966).  Similarly, the extending groups often have no 
clear organizational structures and the structures that do exist do not mirror those of established 
or expanding groups or even those of other extending groups (Scanlon, 1999).  Expanding 
groups tend to have relationships with established groups and other expanding groups; however, 
extending groups do not tend to have such established relationships outside of the group instead 
evidencing strong ties and connections among members of the individual extending 
organizations (Quarantelli et al., 1966).  The structure of these groups is strongly influenced by 
their physical and human capacities.   
The established and expanding/extending groups vary in their physical and human 
resources.  Established groups tend to have stable budgets and material resources such as 
facilities, equipment, transportation, and communication devices that they can utilize when 
carrying out disaster-related tasks (Kennedy et al., 1969; Wenger et al., 1989).  They also have 
experience, knowledge, and trained staff with special skills to carry out response-related tasks 
and activities (see for example: Auf der Heide, 1989; Kennedy et al., 1969; Quarantelli et al., 
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1966; Wenger et al., 1989).  They tend to depend exclusively on their full-time staff and/or 
borrow personnel from the same organizations in surrounding jurisdictions (Quarantelli & 
Dynes, 1977).  
In contrast, expanding/extending groups tend to have limited physical and human 
resources as they largely rely on donation, grants, and volunteers (Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; 
Smith, 2006).  During disasters they are extremely dependent on volunteers (see for example: 
Smith, 1978; Brennan et al., 2007; Hamilton, 2008), who often lack knowledge, skills, and/or 
experience with disasters (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977).  They use non-routine resources and 
activities for non-routine domains and tasks, using non-routine organizational arrangements 
(Majchrzak et al., 2007; Drabek, 1983).  The overall changes in structure and functions of these 
types of groups along with their physical and human capacities may have a significant influence 
on their disaster involvement and how they perceive the events and tasks with which they are 
engaged.  In addition to these factors, their missions and goals may influence how they perceive 
effective response.   
The mission and goals of the nonprofits and government determine their overall role and 
involvement in disasters.  Government’s mission during disasters is described as a population-
based approach due to its mandate to serve the general population (Egan & Tischler, 2010).  
They attempt to assist disaster victims in a manner that helps the greatest number (all, if 
possible) in an environment of scarce resources (Egan & Tischler, 2010; Boris & Steuerle, 
2006b).  Thus, government tends to focus on tasks that benefit communities as a whole (Egan & 
Tischler, 2010).  Examples of these tasks include removing debris and cleaning up major roads 
and bridges, restoring infrastructure and utilities, reestablishing public services (e.g., education, 
permitting, assessing), and reopening public facilities.  Hence, the government’s primary goals 
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are not to directly help each individual and household cope with disaster.  Egan and Tischler 
(2010) stated: 
The populations-based governance approach to disaster management is the right 
approach for a government to take, but it misses the essential human face of the 
disaster- the location of tragedy – an area which the nonprofit sector is uniquely 
positioned to provide a helping hand (p.75). 
 
In contrast to government’s population-based approach, the mission of nonprofits in 
disasters is known as the “helping hand” approach (Egan and Tischler, 2010).  The nonprofits are 
individual-focused and seek to help individuals and families in need (De Vita & Cramer, 2008). 
The “helping hand” approach of nonprofits focuses on providing relief and assistance to disaster 
victims to help them return to self-sufficiency and, if possible, help them become more resilient 
than they were before the disaster (Egan & Tischler, 2010).   
 To the extent they are involved during events, nonprofits tend to run shelters to provide 
safe harbor (see for example: Dalal et al., 2007; Davis, 1977; Dombroski et al., 2006; Hyer et al., 
2007; Nigg et al., 2006; Quarantelli, 1982).  Later, they tend to assist in the provision of food and 
basic supplies, repair and rebuild homes, coordinate volunteers and donations, provide child care, 
legal assistance, and mental and spiritual counseling, among a range of other tasks (Egan & 
Tischler, 2010; Fagnoni, 2006; Goldman, 2006; Pipa, 2006).  The mission of nonprofits is also 
described as intended to “fill the gaps” left by the government (Boris & Steuerle, 2006b; Egan & 
Tischler, 2010; Kapucu, 2003; Pipa, 2006).  To the extent they are successful in doing so, it is 
because they are not bound by the same bureaucratic rules as government; do not have the same 
political constraints; and, have day-to-day missions that are already oriented to individuals and 
households (Boris & Steuerle, 2006b; Egan & Tischler, 2010).  Nonprofits also tend to be 
already in touch with community members and know their needs well (Gazley & Brudney, 2005; 
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Eisner, 2010).  Therefore, the diversity of missions and goals in addition to difference in 
nonprofit and governments approaches may have significant influence on how they think of the 
events in which they are involved and the effectiveness of their related tasks. 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the organizational and disaster-specific differences between 
nonprofits and public agencies.  The literature revealed that nonprofits and public agencies vary 
in regard to their organizational, functional, and cultural structures as well as financial, human, 
and physical capacities generally and during disasters.  Based on an understanding of this 
literature, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the significant differences between these types of 
organizations will lead to differences in how each perceives disasters, their activities related to 
them, and the effectiveness of their activities.  Yet, the literature did not suggest how each of 
these types of organizations might actually conceptualize disaster response effectiveness.  Thus, 
on the basis of this review, a study to explore this topic is justified and the results from such a 
study stand to contribute significantly to the literature.  
While the study recounted in the following chapters was unable to contribute to the 
literature on the topic, exploration of the topic was certainly warranted as is further exploration 
on the topic in the future.  From this point on, the document transitions from providing a 
justification for a study on disaster response effectiveness and a discussion of its potential 
significance to a report of the initial effort undertaken to explore this topic through research. 
Next, Chapter Three describes the data collection approach and method used. 
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CHAPTER THREE: AN INITIAL DATA COLLECTION EFFORT 
This study intended to explore how local nonprofits and public agencies conceptualize 
the key concepts of disaster, response, and effectiveness and attempted to use an internet survey 
for collecting data for this study.  Yet, the initial data collection effort was not successful in 
gathering rich data related to the research topic; and, as a result, the researcher was unable to 
analyze what nonprofit and government agencies thought or how the meanings they gave these 
concepts was different.  To set the stage for the discussion of the data issues that manifested in 
this study and how they might be avoided in the future in the coming chapters, this chapter 
describes the methodological approach that was applied to this study in section one, the sampling 
process used in section two; and, the procedures used to gathering data in section three.  
 Methodological Approach 
 Since the goal of this study was to explore what the concept of disaster response 
effectiveness means to nonprofits and public agencies, there were several reasons the qualitative 
approach was thought to be best suited for this study.  First, as noted by Taylor & Bogdan (1998) 
a qualitative methodology refers in the broadest sense to research that produces descriptive data 
– people’s own written or spoken words and observable behavior (p.7).  Qualitative research 
seeks to understand the particular context within which the participants act and the influence that 
this context has on their actions (Maxwell, 2005, p.22).  Moreover, it enables researchers to 
develop concepts, insights and understanding from patterns in the data rather than collecting and 
assessing from predetermined theories (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998).  Therefore, the researcher 
assumed that qualitative methods would allow her to stay close to the empirical world and collect 
firsthand knowledge about how nonprofits and government conceptualize disaster response 
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effectiveness as well as to ensure a close fit between the findings and what organizations actually 
say and do (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998).    
 The researcher also believed interpretive constructionist theory was particularly 
applicable to this study since researchers adopting this approach seek to understand how people 
view an object or event and the meaning that they attribute to it (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).  
According to the interpretive constructionist perspective, all societies and organizations/groups 
consist of actors who are involved in a constant process of interpreting the world around them on 
the basis of the meanings the things have for them; and, these actors often develop shared 
collective meanings (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998).  Constructionists also expect people to interpret 
and define things differently as they have different experiences and have learned different social 
meanings (Rubin & Rubin, 2005; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998).  Thus, a qualitative study informed 
by an interpretive constructionist approach was assumed to be the best foundation from which to 
build a research design that would gather data from different nonprofits and public agencies 
involved in disaster relief and explore their perception of effectiveness in disaster response.    
Population and Sampling 
 The population for this study included all the nonprofits and public agencies who were 
involved in the aftermath of disaster in the United States.  To narrow the population to a 
reasonable sample for this study, a purposive sampling process was used.  In purposive sampling 
units are chosen because they have particular features or characteristics which will enable 
detailed exploration and understanding of the central themes (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).  The most 
important selection criteria in purposive sampling is individuals who can provide information 
related to a study’s research question (Maxwell, 2005, p.89).  For this research project, the 
individuals in the best position to speak to their agency’s views were thought to be those working 
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for nonprofits or government agencies that were involved in the aftermath of disasters in recent 
years.  Thus, the researcher used a four-step sampling process to develop a sample of these 
individuals for this study.  See Appendix A for the complete description of the four-step 
sampling process that was utilized.  See Appendix B for the counties in the sample and the years 
in which they received PDDs that included individual assistance.  The sampling process resulted 
in 156 individuals in six states including Alabama, California,  Florida, Georgia,  Illinois, and 
Indiana that were invited for participation in this study—78 representing nonprofits and 78 
representing government agencies.   
Data Collection 
 The researcher attempted to collect data through an internet survey hosted by 
SurveyMonkey.com for the initial data collection effort.  Internet surveys can pose a number of 
data collection issues for some respondents including a lack of access to the internet, poor 
internet connection speed, and varying ability to use the internet (Dillman et al., 2009).  The 
researcher believed that the advantages of this means of data collection outweighed the potential 
disadvantages.  The specific advantage that drove the researcher’s decision was that internet 
surveys allow electronic questionnaires to be sent to an entire sample inexpensively and quickly 
(Dillman et al., 2009).  Moreover, the researcher assumed that by virtue of their employment 
potential participants for the study would both be familiar with using the internet and have 
reliable access to it.  Hence, the researcher used an internet survey to attempt to collect 
information related to the topic of this study from 156 potential participants for no cost and in a 
limited timeframe.  Based on this rationale, data collection proceeded between November and 
December 2012.    
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 The researcher followed the procedures for distributing and designing internet surveys 
suggested by Dillman et al. (2009).  The participants were contacted via email and invited to 
participate in the study.  Within the invitation email, the researcher provided a link to the internet 
survey.  See the invitation email in Appendix C.  When participants followed the link provided, 
the first page they encountered included the title of the survey, a description of the study, and 
why their participation was important (Dillman et al., 2009).  See Appendix D for the 
information sheet and a screenshot of the initial survey.  It was believed that sending information 
to potential respondents about the survey and how the results would benefit others would 
encourage survey participation (Dillman et al., 2009).  The invitation email and information 
sheets also included positive regards such as “Thank you in advance for your participation” to 
encourage them to respond.    
The researcher monitored the survey completions in real time; and, as representatives 
from nonprofits and public agencies completed the survey, the organization was crossed off the 
list.  Respondents need to be given adequate time to respond before reminders begin arriving, 
and waiting to send reminders will give a researcher time to identify and address problems if 
they occur (Dillman et al., 2009, p.278).  However, it was assumed that e-mails as opposed to 
letters by mail are more likely to be quickly dismissed, forgotten, or sent to “junk mail”.  In an 
effort to balance these concerns, a reminder /thank you email was sent one week after the initial 
invitation email.  The timing of this contact was thought to be reasonable and was consistent 
with Dillman et al. (2009).  See Appendix E for the reminder email and Appendix F for the 
“thank you” email that was used.  
 A second invitation email was sent to those who had not completed the survey the week 
after the reminder email.  The second follow-up invitation was different in tone, focusing, in a 
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friendly way, on the short amount of time that is left to complete the survey and the importance 
of responding.  See Appendix G for the second invitation letter that was sent to the remaining 
individuals in the sample.  And, seven days following the second invitation email, a final 
reminder was sent.  See Appendix H for the final follow-up e-mail.  These multiple contacts 
were undertaken because Dillman et al. (2009) suggest that sending multiple contacts to potential 
web survey respondents is the most effective way to increase response rates (p. 275).  Thus, the 
researcher contacted potential respondents five times.  The researcher closed the survey one 
week after the second reminder email was sent.   
Survey questions were developed in accordance with Dillman et al., (2009).  The goal of 
survey development was to have questions that every potential respondent would interpret in the 
same way, be able to respond to accurately, and be willing to answer (Dillman et al., 2009).  The 
survey was comprised of both open-ended and closed-ended questions.  Open-ended questions 
are flexible, intended to obtain descriptive response to a specific topic, and allow respondents to 
freely answer the question as they want without limiting their response (Dillman et al., 2009).  
This was done so that neither the researcher nor the survey instrument would overwhelm 
respondents or constrain their answers.   
The original survey included the following questions with ample space following each for 
participants to respond: 
1. How would you describe the day-to-day, overall mission of your organization? 
 
2. What makes a disaster a “disaster”? 
 
3. How does your organization respond after a disaster occurs in your community? 
 
4. In the context of disaster, what does the term “response” mean to you? 
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5. How do you assess the effectiveness of your organization’s response? 
 
6. Please use this space to address anything related to disasters that you think I should 
know. 
The first question was asked to learn about the activities and tasks that organizations 
carry out daily in non-emergency periods.  The government’s day-to-day mission is clear as they 
were expected to respond to local emergencies.  Nonprofits are very diverse and their daily 
missions were not necessarily expected to be oriented around disasters.  Thus, learning about 
their day-to-day mission helps to obtain a general understanding on what nonprofits do on a daily 
basis; what kind of capacities or resources they possess; and how they may be incorporated 
during the disasters.  The other survey questions are directly linked to the research question for 
this study and ask participants to describe their understanding of the key concepts of disaster, 
response, and effectiveness.  The last question provided an opportunity for participants to share 
any information they think would be valuable for this study.   
The closed-ended questions in the survey were intended to obtain demographic 
information.  They were asked at the end of the survey because open-ended questions require 
some time for thinking and reflecting (Dillman et al., 2009).  The following closed-ended 
questions were asked in the survey:  
1. In what city, county, and state is your organization located? 
 
2. What is the name of your organization? 
 
3. Please identify the category to which your organization belongs? 
 
o Government agency 
o Nonprofit organization 
o Other (please specify) 
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Prior to sending the initial invitation to participate in this study, the researcher sent a copy of the 
survey to several nonprofit and government agency representatives in the Fargo-Moorhead area 
for their review.  In her email request to review the survey, the researcher asked the 
representatives to provide feedback as to the survey’s clarity and wording.  In total four 
individuals reviewed the survey (2 nonprofit, 2 government agency).  Only minor revisions were 
recommended; and, these recommendations were followed.  See Appendix D for a screenshot of 
the final, original survey.   
As the researcher monitored the survey responses in real time, she noticed issues with 
data collection.  Specifically, the response rate from the initial invitation email was incredibly 
low and there were issues with the data provided by those who responded.  While the initial 
invitation to participate in the study was sent to 150 potential participants, only 11 individuals 
followed the survey link; and, of those 11 only six of them completed the survey (i.e., 3 
nonprofit and 3 government representatives).  And, the responses to the initial survey questions 
were brief, vague, incomplete, and needed further clarification to be understood.  Some answers 
were not related to the topic and were missing the points of the question.  
It was thought that perhaps one of the explanations for participant failure to complete the 
survey, or complete it without much detail, was the open and broad nature of the questions.  It 
was thought that perhaps the questions were so open and broad that participant’s did not know 
where to start in constructing a response.  After meeting with her advisor, the researcher 
modified the question format in an attempt to make the survey easier to answer.  With the 
exception of the first question related to the organization’s mission, all of the open-ended 
questions were modified to ask participants for two characteristics or two examples.  A specific 
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space, small in appearance, was provided for participants to answer.  An additional space was 
labeled “other characteristics” in case participants had more they wanted to communicate with 
respect to the question.  Figure 1is presented below as an example; and, the full, revised survey 
can be viewed in Appendix I.  These alterations to the questionnaire were consistent with 
Dillman et al. (2009).   
Figure 1. Screenshot of modified questionnaire. 
 
A week after the initial invitation the researcher sent out a follow-up email with the link 
to the modified survey.  Eight participants started the survey and seven of them completed it.  
The nature of the responses changed due to the alterations made to the survey.  Now, the answers 
directly addressed the survey question for the most part.  A few participants provided detailed 
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information by giving examples from their organization’s experience; yet, the majority still 
provided short and vague answers.   
Because the response rate was still very low relative to the sample (N= 19 with only 13 
completed out of a possible N of 150), the researcher decided, in cooperation with her advisor, to 
change the content of the second invitation and follow-up emails.  The second invitation email 
was rewritten to make the survey seem less threatening.  For instance, it informed respondents 
that the survey does not require special training or expertise to answer the questions.  Please see 
Appendix J for a copy of the revised second invitation email.  In total, 22 additional participants 
followed the link to the survey after the second invitation and follow-up email.  Of these, 17 
answered all the questions; yet, their answers continued to be both short and vague.    
Overall, the researcher contacted potential participants five times between November and 
December of 2012.  These contacts resulted in a total of 41 participants out of 150 potential 
participants following the link to the survey.  Of these, only 30 completed the survey, including 
16 from public sector and 14 from nonprofits.  The vast majority of participants from the public 
sector were local emergency managers (N=9); the remaining participants represented police 
departments (N=4) and fire departments (N=3).  As for nonprofit participants, the majority 
represented local churches such as the Lutheran Church, First Baptist Church, and United 
Methodist Church.    
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the qualitative research methods that were used in an initial data 
collection effort to explore nonprofit and public agency conceptualizations of disaster response 
effectiveness as well as a rationale for the use of those methods.  The researcher followed the 
survey design and data collection recommendations of Dillman et al. (2009) and made an attempt 
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to adjust the survey when she found that participants were not providing responses of any great 
length or detail.  Ultimately, despite these efforts, the data that was provided by participants was 
not conducive to the kind of data analysis that the researcher had planned to use.  The next 
chapter reviews the data analysis technique that the researcher had hoped to use for this study.  It 
also provides examples from the data to demonstrate why the technique could not be used.   
 
  
  
33 
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ISSUES 
This chapter is comprised of two main sections.  The following section describes the data 
analysis technique that the researcher intended to use to explore the data collected through this 
study.  The next section discusses the data collected and why the data was not conducive to 
analysis with the intended technique.  Ample examples from the data are provided to highlight 
the issues encountered.   
Intended Data Analysis Technique 
 As discussed in Chapter Three, qualitative data collection methods were used for this 
study.  To complement the qualitative approach to data collection, the researcher intended to use 
a qualitative analytical technique known as “The Analytic Hierarchy” described in Ritchie and 
Lewis (2003).  The “Analytic Hierarchy” refers to a process through which qualitative “findings” 
are built from the original raw data (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).  The technique entails three stages 
of analysis including data management, descriptive accounts, and explanatory accounts.   
Data Management 
 Data management initially involves deciding upon the themes or concepts under which 
the data will be labeled, sorted, and compared (Ritchie et al., 2003).  The background 
information presented in Chapter One of this proposal suggested that there have been past 
attempts to create organizing systems for emergency management; that nonprofits have been 
largely ignored in the development of these systems; that there is growing recognition of the 
need to work with nonprofits if we are to have a system that works; and, to have such a system, it 
must be based on an understanding of what constitutes effective disaster response.  As revealed 
in the literature review, nonprofits and government are involved in the aftermath of disasters; 
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and, there is reason to believe they may have different views about the events, activities, and 
goals of their efforts.  Thus, questions were developed to explore what nonprofits and 
government representatives think with respect to each of these areas.   
  Because the researcher conducted a survey with questions that explore thematic areas, 
the steps in the Ritchie & Lewis (2003) Analytical Hierarchy related to data management were, 
from the study’s inception, not necessary to use.  For instance, sorting, identification of initial 
themes, and indexing was not required because material with similar content or properties was 
already located together by survey question design.  Thus, the researcher’s analysis would have 
revolved around the next two stages of the Analytical Hierarchy – the development of descriptive 
and explanatory accounts—if the data had been favorable to such analysis.   
Descriptive Accounts 
 Developing a descriptive account involves detection, categorization, and classification of 
the substantive content and dimensions of phenomena.  Detection involves looking within the 
data related to one of the survey questions across individual surveys and noting the perceptions, 
views, and experience or behavior related to the question.  Categorization and classification then 
transition data analysis from individual survey data to the survey data collectively.  In this stage, 
the collective data are categorized and refined separately, in this case for the nonprofit 
organization and public organization survey data related to each of the concepts embedded 
within this study’s research question (e.g., disaster, response and effectiveness).  The extent to 
which the categories and classifications derived are different between the two groups is explored 
and described.  Phrases and expressions are retained in the participant’s own language; 
interpretations are kept to a minimum so there is an opportunity to revisit participant’s original 
expressions (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).   
  
35 
Explanatory Accounts 
 The development of explanatory accounts is the last stage of analysis in the Hierarchy.  
At this stage, the researcher seeks to find patterns of association within the data related to each 
question and across questions and then attempts to explain why those patterns occur (Ritchie & 
Lewis, 2003, p. 261).  The process is undertaken to account for differences that may be observed, 
in this case 1) in the nonprofit data; 2) in the public organization data; 3) between nonprofit data 
and public organization data.  Variation in what the concepts of disaster, response, and 
effectiveness mean to these two groups would have been explained using common sense, seeking 
explanatory concepts within the data, and drawing on the literature review presented for this 
study (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).  
Should the survey have resulted in rich data, the researcher would have the Analytical 
Hierarchy for data analysis.  Assuming the researcher appropriately and carefully carried out her 
analysis, she would have been able to 1) explain the meaning of the concepts of disaster, 
response, and effectiveness from both nonprofit and public perspectives; 2) explain major 
patterns related to the data; 3) offer explanations of the similarities and differences between the 
data from the two types of organizations; and, 4) on the basis of the analysis, discuss 
implications for emergency management coordination systems  and emergency management 
theory.  The Hierarchy is a powerful analytic technique and as a result of using it the researcher 
may have been able to make significant contributions to practice and theory.  Yet, the researcher 
could not use the Hierarchy and the section to follow describes why that is the case. 
Data Issues 
As previously stated, the responses to the survey generally lacked depth and detail.  The 
answers to the questions asked were short and incomplete.  Most of the responses consisted of 
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one word or a phrase that would require further explanation or clarification to be understood in 
relation to this study’s research question.  The following paragraphs are intended to provide the 
reader with a sense of the issues that the researcher encountered when attempting to analyze the 
data from the surveys and the difficulties these issues posed for utilizing the Analytic Hierarchy.  
The survey asked participants to answer a question about what makes a disaster a 
disaster, how their organization responds to disaster, what response means to them, and how they 
assess the effectiveness of their organization’s response.  The researcher discovered issues 
related to the length and/or depth of participant responses to all of these questions.  
When participants were asked to define the concept of disaster by identifying two 
characteristics that distinguish it from other types of events, participants tended to offer short 
answers in reply—some even limited to a single word or phrase.  For instance, one participant 
wrote the word “unplanned” and “disrupting” in the spaces provide; another just the phrases 
“displaces individuals”, “damages or destroys public or private property”, and “creates a gap in 
basic human needs being met”; and, another “anything that affects our area” and “all disasters 
starts and ends local”.  On the other hand, some respondents provided a more comprehensive 
response.  As one participant put it, 
 A minor disaster is an adverse event that may have impacted more than one 
jurisdiction, or may pose a threat of additional danger to public safety across 
several jurisdictions. Mutual aid is required from adjacent jurisdictions. A major 
disaster is an adverse event that impacts numerous county jurisdictions. Resources 
organic to jurisdictions of the county are insufficient and direct mutual aid is 
immediately required from either adjacent counties or state agencies. A 
catastrophic disaster is an event that has impacted severely on a major segment of 
the county involving many jurisdictions. Mutual aid is necessary from adjacent 
counties, state, federal and private sector resources for a prolonged period to meet 
both human response and recovery needs and reestablish the infrastructure.  
 
These examples demonstrate the variation of answers by their length and depth.  
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 The quality of the data did not improve when the researcher examined the data related to 
the next survey question, “how does your organization respond after a disaster occurs”.  Few 
participants provided specific examples of how their organization is involved in response efforts 
despite the prompt to do so in the survey question.  For instance, one participant responded 
“assistance” and “coordination”; another “working together every day” and “within 30 min”;  
and, another simply wrote “mass care” and “individual and household recovery”.  Just what these 
organizations are doing in the aftermath of the disaster is unclear from the participant responses.  
Other participants provided answers that were difficult to interpret despite using more words.  
For instance, the following statement exemplifies the vagueness of many of the responses, 
This agency coordinates with local emergency response agencies to meet their 
needs to effectively respond to the disaster. This agency coordinates with state 
and federal agencies to meet the needs of those affected by the disaster.  
 
In this example, it is unclear what coordination means to the participant, the extent to which the 
organization actually coordinates with other agencies at the local, state, and federal levels, why 
this is desirable, how coordination is related to needs, which agencies they work with, what 
specific tasks or services they coordinate with others, whether the tasks and activities they 
undertake are intended to meet the needs of the community at-large or segments of the 
community, and how this participant’s statement relates to the concept of response and its 
meaning.  It should be clear from these examples that analysis of what each individual 
organization was doing in response was difficult to analyze much less how the response activities 
of nonprofits might differ from government agencies.  
When asked what the term response meant to them, the same issues were evidenced. 
Some participants provided a one word or short phrase reply, e.g., response is “open EOC”, 
“everyone working together”.  Some participants provided longer but equally vague answers.  
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For example, one participant stated, “Response term means fire and rescue, police, medical, 
power restoration, safe roads from debris and feeding and shelter”; another “response would be 
things that we do that are directly related to the event”; and, another “response for most disaster 
situations we have 2 hour window of time for our staff to arrive at the scene of the emergency 
that is what our response is”.  Another participant wrote, 
Response is an active approach to attack the effects of the disaster by putting 
boots on the ground; additionally, response is actually making contact with those 
directly affected by the disaster.  This agency's response is passive because the 
agency's personnel play a more active role behind the scenes and do not initially 
make direct contact with those affected by the disaster.  
The example above led to more questions than it did revelations of what response meant to the 
participant.  What was meant by active approach and what boots on the ground means is 
unknown as is how putting boots on the ground addresses disaster effects.  Moreover, how the 
agency is playing a passive role while personnel are active is unclear as well as what role 
personnel are playing behind the scenes and how that role relates to the participant’s 
conceptualization of the term response.   From these responses the researcher was unable to tell 
what exactly the concept of response meant to the participant.   
The data issues did not improve with respect to participant responses to the final open-
ended question requesting participants to identify two ways they assess the effectiveness of their 
organizations response.  Examples of responses to this question include “fire rescue relationship” 
and “client surveys”, “responder coordination” and “relief”, and “people are safe” and “people in 
need are being served”.  These responses were not enough to reveal what effectiveness may 
mean to these organizations or how they assess it.  For instance, “client surveys” as a measure of 
effectiveness is too vague to be meaningful in analysis since who the clients are that are being 
surveyed, when/how they are being surveyed, what they are asked, how what they are asked 
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relates to the organization’s assessment of its effectiveness, the threshold at which the 
organization would deem itself effective as a result of the data collected, and what would be 
done within the organization if the surveys were to show the organization ineffective remain 
unanswered.  The same participant also identified “fire rescue relationship” as a measure of 
organizational effectiveness but what “relationship” means, what about the relationship would 
connote an effective response versus an ineffective one, and how they assess the relationship is 
unclear. Had more of these issues been addressed in the participant’s response—and others—
analysis might have been possible.  There are many other examples of problematic data such as 
the following:   
Our agency utilizes an action report that we utilize to evaluate our effectiveness. 
We work with our EMA to gauge our effectiveness. We document the resources 
that are utilized during the event and measure our results. We work with the state 
and federal agencies that assist with measuring our effectiveness. 
What an action report is and how it is actually used cannot be discerned from this 
participant’s response.  Additionally, how the organization works with the EMA to 
determine effectiveness is left unstated. In this example the link between resources and 
effectiveness is also clear enough but the participant did not explain whether resource use 
is the only organization that matters for their organization’s effectiveness, what results 
are being measured, or how they measure those results.  Another example of a poor 
response to this question is the following:  
All individuals in need of meals as a result of the disaster have meals provided for 
them. All individuals seeking shelter in response to the disaster have a temporary 
place to stay.  Individuals impacted begin transitioning into the recovery process. 
Whether effectiveness is in meeting the needs of individuals or in the completion of the tasks to 
meet those needs is uncertain from what was written as is how the organization tracks individual 
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need and whether individuals have shelter and meals and whether they consider themselves 
effective if less than all individuals have shelter/meals.  Moreover, how the organization 
identifies that an individual is transitioning into recovery and how they assess their 
organization’s role relative to it is left out of the participant’s response.  Participant responses left 
the research with many questions and unable to tell what effectiveness mean to participants or 
how it would be assessed. 
 The brevity, vagueness, and lack of depth of participant responses to the survey 
questions made it inappropriate to utilize the Analytic Hierarchy for data analysis.  Use of the 
Hierarchy challenges researchers to first generate descriptive accounts beginning with the 
process of detection and ending with categorization and classification; yet, the researcher was 
unable to detect the perceptions, views, experience, and/or behavior of participants individually 
much less nonprofit and government agencies as distinct groups.  Since the initial stage of 
generating descriptive accounts could not be completed, it was inappropriate to continue on to 
the next stage in the Hierarchy—generating explanatory accounts.  
Conclusion 
This study was unable to generate meaningful findings with respect to the study’s 
research question.  The study’s failure was not due to the research question, its qualitative 
approach, the populations sampled, or the analytic technique intended for use—all of these 
elements of the research design were appropriately conceived and implemented.  The failure of 
this study was due to the data collection method.  The chapter to follow connects the data issues 
experienced in this study to problems associated with survey research.  The chapter also 
recommends an alternate data collection method that should be used in the future to gather the 
type of data needed to holistically analyze this study’s research question.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: APPROACH TO FUTURE RESEARCH  
This study intended to explore how nonprofits and government perceive disaster response 
effectiveness by collecting data through an online survey and analyzing it with the Analytic 
Hierarchy posited in Ritchie and Lewis (2003).  As has been described in Chapters Three and 
Four, the researcher’s initial data collection and analysis efforts did not proceed as planned due 
to issues with the data collected.  This chapter discusses the relationship between the weaknesses 
in the data collected and the methods employed to collect the data in its first section.  And, the 
second section analyzes the weaknesses in the data collected in conjunction with an alternate 
data collection method that will minimize, if not eliminate, those weaknesses in future studies on 
this topic.  
The Data Issues-Data Collection Connection 
As frustrating as the researcher found the responses provided by study participants, the 
researcher was not entirely surprised that these issues manifested in this study.  The risks 
associated with survey research—particularly internet surveys—are known.  In fact, the data 
issues that were evidenced in this study were nothing the literature on survey research had not 
already noted as potential weaknesses of the data collection approach. 
The literature on survey research suggests that close-ended questions are more useful in 
survey research than open-ended.  It has been noted numerous times that open-ended questions 
do not often result in lengthy, detailed responses (see for example: Babbie, 2010; Dillman et al., 
2009; Hakim, 1987; Rubin & Rubin, 2005).  As Fowler (2002) put it,  
Generally speaking, if one is going to have a self-administered questionnaire one must 
reconcile oneself to closed questions, that is, questions that can be answered simply by 
checking a box or circling the proper response from a set provided by the 
researcher…self-administered open answers often do not produce useful data…(p. 62). 
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One reason useful data does not often result from open-ended questions is, as Babbie (2010) 
stated, “…respondents will read items quickly and give quick answers” to survey questions (p. 
260).  As a result, participant answers tend to be unclear and sometimes irrelevant to the 
objective associated with the question (Fowler, 2002).  And, in survey research, there is not an 
opportunity for the researcher to attempt to guide participant responses back to the topic of the 
question or explore more fully what a participant meant in a given response (Dillman et al., 
2009; Fowler, 2002).  Due to these issues, open-ended question data from surveys is often 
difficult to analyze and not comparable across surveys even with respect to data from the same 
question (Fowler, 2002).  Dillman et al. (2009) suggest that it is wise to use open-ended 
questions “sparingly and only for important topics about which descriptive information is 
necessary” (p. 114).  Perhaps it is due to the weaknesses associated with open-ended survey 
questions that surveys, as a data collection approach, are rarely described as a qualitative data 
collection technique (see for example: Babbie, 2010; Creswell, 2007; Fowler, 2002; Lune, 
Pumar, & Koppel, 2010).  
Given these comments from the literature, it would appear that this study’s reliance 
almost entirely on open-ended, broad questions using a survey data collection method was 
flawed from the start.  The open-ended, broad nature of the questions was consistent with 
qualitative research (Babbie, 2010; Creswell, 2007) and the research question for this study; yet, 
the data from participant responses evidenced the problems associated with survey-based data 
collection.  The responses provided by participants to the questions tended to be quite short and 
vague, often limited to a single word or phrase—the opposite of the rich, dense, comprehensive, 
and detailed responses exploring the research question for this study would have required.  Even 
when the researcher made the questions and space provided for responses more structured in an 
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effort to bring about more developed responses from participants, nothing changed.  Ultimately, 
the data provided proved insufficient to analyze because the researcher was unable to interpret 
what participants actually meant by their responses.  
There also may have been an issue with survey question design from the start.  Questions 
in survey research ought to be carefully crafted according to the literature.  Among other 
considerations, questions should be developed, to the extent possible, to ensure that all study 
participants find the questions relevant (Babbie, 2010) or “highly salient” (Dillman et al., 2009). 
This is particularly important for open-ended questions since, as Dillman et al., (2009), stated 
“descriptive open-ended questions are… ‘expensive’ for respondents in the sense that answering 
them requires a significant investment of time and effort on their part” (p. 113).  
With respect to this study, there may have been a question design issue in this area.  The 
researcher attempted to identify potential study participants that would be in a position to provide 
the data required for this study through a purposive process involving multiple steps as reviewed 
in Chapter Three.  Given the research question for the study and the significant role that 
nonprofit and government organization play in disasters, there was no better sample frame to 
draw from.  It is possible, however, that while the potential respondents were in a position to 
provide the required data, they were not interested in providing it much less spending time to 
respond at any length or to any detail.  If more time and attention had been devoted to wording 
the questions in a way that made them relevant for all participants, then perhaps more developed 
responses to survey questions would have been provided. 
Another limitation of survey research that manifested in this data collection effort was a 
low response rate.  Only 41 participants out of 150 followed the link to the survey and of these 
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only 30 of them completed the survey.  The researcher modified the content of the invitation and 
follow-up email to encourage increased participation, but the response rate remained low.  
The low response rate associated with this study is not a problem in and of itself.  Issues 
of nonresponse bias are not central in qualitative work as they are in quantitative work.  In 
qualitative research, numbers of responses are not the focus of the researcher so much as the 
ability of those sampled to provide the data needed to explore the research question posed and 
the quality of the data collected (Creswell, 2007).  Nevertheless, if participation were higher, it is 
possible that there would have been more, and perhaps better, data.  Because of this possibility, it 
is worth further exploring the issue of why the response rate was low.  
Enlisting sufficient participation is a well-known challenge associated with internet 
surveys (Fowler, 2002).  There is a widespread cultural trend of suspicion of research and a lack 
of interest/willingness to participate in survey research in the United States that can negatively 
impact response rates (Dillman et al., 2009).  Moreover, there is a trend of distrust in internet 
communications and interactions that can also negatively influence response rates (Dillman, et 
al., 2009, p. 9).  Potential participants may avoid even opening an unsolicited, email invitation to 
participate in the research due to these trends (Dillman et al., 2009, p. 9).  Given these issues, 
Fowler’s (2002) comment that “the response rate for mail or e-mail surveys depends critically on 
the population and the survey’s purpose” makes sense (p. 65) as does his suggestion that these 
factors play a critical role in “the overall success of the [survey] effort” (p. 50).  
To overcome the aforementioned cultural trends surrounding survey research, the 
population sampled must be motivated to respond by the survey’s purpose.  In this case, the 
populations sampled were individuals representing nonprofit and government organizations that 
had been involved in several disasters in the past decade.  The conceptualizations of these 
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individuals matters particularly with respect to the study’s research question.  Yet, as the 
literature review in Chapter Two established, nonprofits are different one to the next and 
disaster-related activities are not central to the mission of the vast majority of nonprofits.  
Furthermore, even while government organizations are similar one to the next in critical ways, 
the literature review demonstrated that most government organizations (e.g., fire, law 
enforcement, public works) revert to their pre-disaster tasks and activities as quickly as possible 
following such an event.  The literature suggests that disasters are just not that much of a day-to-
day focus for the populations sampled for this survey; and, thus, getting a good response rate 
from these populations on a disaster-related topic was going to be challenge before data 
collection began.  The use of a survey to collect data from these populations particularly a survey 
with a purpose that was most likely not interesting enough to elicit the interest, much less their 
time and attention, was probably not the best choice. 
The researcher chose a qualitative approach for her initial data collection effort because it 
was most appropriate given her research question.  A qualitative approach remains the most 
suitable for exploration of nonprofit and government organization views of disaster response 
effectiveness despite the fact that the particular data collection method used in this attempt to 
study the topic did result in data suitable for analysis.  The data issues experienced in this study 
were simply manifestations of weaknesses already associated with survey research.  Should this 
topic be explored through research in the future a different qualitative data collection method—
one known for producing rich, thick data and one wholly divorced from issues related to 
numbers of responses—must be used.  
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An Alternate Method 
The length and depth/detail of participant responses hindered this study.  These issues 
were experienced because there was a mismatch between the research question and the nature of 
the data needed to explore that question and the data collection method used.  Had another 
qualitative data collection method been utilized, the data issues would likely have not been seen.  
The following paragraphs suggest that use of in-depth, semi-structured interviews to collect data 
on this topic would have minimized, if not, eliminated entirely the data issues observed in this 
study. 
The length and depth/detail of participant responses presented a problem in this study. 
Participants seemed to provide quick, “off the cuff” answer to the survey questions.  They wrote 
very little even though ample space was provided for extended responses to the questions posed. 
This issue of short, thin responses is not normally associated with in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews because of social norms, the availability of techniques to elicit greater depth, and the 
flexibility of questioning.  
While this study found that participants did not seem to want to write, most people like to 
talk.  As Rubin and Rubin (2005) stated, “…most people like to talk … and are pleased that 
somebody is interested in what they have to say” (p. 90).  Interviews also can capitalize on the 
social norms of talking and reciprocity that demand an answer be provided when a question is 
asked (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).  Of course, there is no guarantee that people will speak to the 
question asked at length or to any detail.  After all, “in normal conversations people often answer 
formalistically, providing little detail” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 113).  Yet, in interviews the 
interviewer has many opportunities to signal their interest in depth.  For instance, an interviewer 
can choose not to interrupt a participant’s response to a question, ask a double-barreled question, 
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ask about specific words or terms that the researcher does not understand, and “indicate [their] 
familiarity with the interviewee’s world so that the person knows that superficial answers won’t 
teach [the interviewer] all that much” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 112-114).  Using these 
techniques interviewers can elicit greater depth in participant responses in interviews.  No 
equivalent techniques were available for the researcher to elicit greater depth in the survey 
responses.  
Follow-up questions and probes are additional means of getting more detailed responses 
from participants that are not available in an internet survey.  Generally, interviews are structured 
around a series of main questions that cover the main parts of the research question (Rubin & 
Rubin, 2005, p. 129).  These main questions are complemented by follow-up questions “to obtain 
depth, detail, and subtlety, while clarifying answers that are vague or superficial” and probes that 
“help manage the conversation by keeping it on topic, signaling the desired level of depth, and 
asking for examples or clarification” initiated by the interviewer in real time (Rubin & Rubin, 
2005, p. 112).  The questions asked in the survey for this study are what Rubin & Rubin (2005) 
would describe as main questions and what was missing and would have helped bring about the 
needed depth in participant responses were follow-up questions and probes.    
Examining the data from this study that were used as examples in Chapter Four, it is 
obvious that follow-ups and probes would have been of great benefit.  For instance, the 
researcher would have had the opportunity to ask “what is it about these tasks that makes them 
response” if a participant had said “Response term means fire and rescue, police, medical, power 
restoration, safe roads from debris and feeding and shelter” in response to an interview question 
about what response meant to them.  And, if a participant had said “responder coordination” in 
reply to a question about how his/her organization assessed its response effectiveness, the 
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researcher would have been able to ask questions such as “What do you mean by the term 
responder?; “Who do you consider responders?”; “What does coordination mean?”; and, “How 
do you know when coordination has been achieved?” Without the ability to ask these follow-up 
questions and probes, the researcher was left with no more or less than the reply written by the 
participant. 
 Another advantage associated with in-depth interviews that is not with internet surveys is 
the flexibility of the design throughout the process.  While the researcher did alter the structure 
of the survey questions after data collection had ensued, the basic questions being asked 
remained the same.  It would have been inappropriate to have dramatically changed the survey 
even though it was clear that participants were not providing the kind of data needed because all 
participants would not have had the chance to answer the same questions.  Ideally, the researcher 
would have been able to change questions by breaking the question topic into several questions 
and changing wording significantly when it was clear the questions being asked were not 
understood or were not generating the data needed.  In interviews, it is expected that questioning 
remains flexible throughout the interview process to accommodate new information, adapt to the 
actual experiences that people have had, and adjust to unexpected situations (Rubin & Rubin, 
2005, p.35).  As Rubin & Rubin (2005) noted, 
Unlike survey research, in which the exactly same question is asked to each 
individual, in qualitative interviews each conversation is unique, as researchers 
match their question to what each interviewee knows and willing to share (p.4).  
 
The use of a survey prevented the researcher from being flexible in her questioning when it was 
clear that participants were not responding as she would have hoped whereas use of semi-
structured interviews as a data collection method would have allowed her to adapt to the 
situation.  
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Conclusion 
While the researcher’s initial data collection efforts did not result in the kind of 
contribution to the research literature the researcher had hoped, this study and the analysis of its 
execution has nevertheless made an important contribution.  By discussing the issues that 
hampered data collection and thwarted analysis, this study ought to help future researchers avoid 
similar issues.  Moreover, through suggesting an alternate method to study this topic, the 
researcher has provided a path forward for future research.  
Exploration of the topic of how disaster response effectiveness is conceptualized and the 
implications of that conceptualization for coordination systems is important for practice and also 
for the emerging academic discipline of emergency management.  Research on the topic is sorely 
needed.  Because research on the topic is in such short supply, the researcher decided to 
informally examine the data that she collected for a) what, if any, patterns existed in the data 
(however poor); b) if patterns were discovered, any evidence of differences in government and 
nonprofit views; and, c) if patterns were discovered, any hypotheses that might be tested through 
future research.  The potential to suggest hypotheses for future testing stood to make another 
contribution to the research literature in addition to the aforementioned methodological 
contributions.  The researcher’s analysis of the data is reported in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX: INITIAL ANALYSIS OF DATA 
While the researcher was unable to analyze the data formally through the use of the 
Hierarchy, she attempted to informally review the data to see if examination of it might leave her 
with some initial thoughts as to what disaster response effectiveness means to nonprofits and 
government organizations and whether there was any evidence that nonprofits and government 
organizations perceive disaster response effectiveness differently.  Two steps were taken to 
examine the data.  First, the researcher looked at the data from nonprofit and government 
participants related to each survey question for any patterns that might exist.  Of note, all of the 
data analyzed is available for review in Appendixes K-N. Following this step, the researcher 
evaluated the extent to which the patterns that emerged from each group’s data were different. 
The results of this analysis are related in the following pages as are hypotheses of what future 
research might find based on this analysis.  
Analysis of Data on Definition of Disaster 
No consensus was evident in the nonprofit data regarding how participants conceptualize 
the concept of disaster although two patterns were found with respect to what disaster meant to 
these participants.  The first pattern that emerged was that approximately half of the nonprofit 
participants define disaster in terms of impact to individuals and households (e.g., disaster is an 
event that “results in people’s lives being turned upside down”, “forces a person to be 
unexpectedly homeless and potentially without documents, medicine, clothes or food”, 
“displaces individuals”).  The second pattern contrasts with the first.  Approximately half of the 
nonprofit participants (not the same as those referred to with respect to the previous pattern) 
define disasters predominately in terms of the at-large impact of the event (e.g., disasters are 
events that result in “great damage or loss of life”, “mass loss of property and human life”, 
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“impacts [to] all sectors in the community”).  Thus, while patterns emerged, the ones evidenced 
did not provide the researcher with a sense of how nonprofits collectively conceptualize disaster. 
With respect to government’s conceptualization of disaster, a number of patterns also 
emerged.  First, government participants seem to define disaster in terms of large-scale impact 
(e.g., disaster is “severe”, “affects the entire population”, “affecting a large group of people or 
property”, and “affects a vast number”).  Government participants also seem to define disaster in 
terms of resources; specifically, the overwhelming of jurisdictional resources.  They used 
language such as “emergency situation beyond our resources”, “when all of my ‘local’ resources 
are or soon will be used or depleted”, and “resources organic to jurisdictions of the county are 
insufficient” to describe this disaster feature.  They also saw disasters in terms of jurisdictional 
capability, i.e., disasters overwhelm the capability of a jurisdiction to address the needs of the 
event on their own.  Phrases like “not enough help”, “depletes the capability for a county to 
effectively respond”, “exceeds the normal day-to-day emergency response capabilities of our 
community”, and “beyond your normal capability” were used to describe disaster.   
Based on this data, it does appear that nonprofit and government organizations have 
somewhat different views of what a disaster is.  It seems that the government participants in this 
study had a clearer conceptualization of what a disaster is than nonprofit participants. It also 
seems that government participants had, to some extent, a shared sense of some of the key 
characteristics that define these events.  The nonprofit participants did not seem to have any sort 
of collective notion of what a disaster is, and the two themes of meaning that were discovered 
seemed in contrast to one another.  Based on this limited analysis, the following hypotheses 
regarding nonprofit and government organization conceptualizations of the concept of disaster 
might be explored through future research:  
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H1: Nonprofit and government organizations both conceptualize a disaster primarily in 
terms of impact but do so in different ways. 
H2: Government organizations have a more specific, or operational definition, of disaster 
than do nonprofit organizations.  
Analysis of Data Related to the Meaning of Response 
Study participants were asked two survey questions regarding their conceptualization of 
response—one question asked what response means to them and the other asked them to identify 
their organization’s response activities.  Since both of these questions were included in the 
survey to shed light on the meaning of response to study participants, the analysis of the data 
from both questions has been integrated in the paragraphs to follow. 
Nonprofits seemed to define response in terms of the specific activities they do in the 
aftermath of disaster.  For instance, when asked what response meant to them, one participant 
wrote “we have building teams, cleaning teams, chainsaw teams, counseling teams, and case 
management teams, etc.”, another “response to us means…ensuring their ongoing needs are 
being met, that they are safe, sheltered, and being fed”, “response for us is not life, property, or 
asset protection but meeting the…needs of individuals through providing shelter and food”.  It 
appears that nonprofit participants considered any activities their organization carries out after a 
disaster to be “response” activities (i.e., “response would be things that we do that are directly 
related to the event”).  Most of the “response” activities they identified generally begin in the 
initial hours after disaster impact.  And, while some of these activities might cease within several 
days of the disaster impact, most would continue on into the weeks and, possibly, months 
following the event.  The data also showed that the activities of nonprofits tend to be directed 
toward meeting the basic needs of individuals and households.  Examples of the tasks and 
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activities included “providing additional food, water, and services to people who have been 
impacted”, “specific things we have done in the past include in the short term providing food, 
water, clothing, financial resources, transportation, communications, counseling, referrals for 
housing”, and “we provide food, shelter, clothing, clean-up supplies, and grief counseling as we 
help people get back on their feet”.  
With respect to government, the data revealed a number of patterns related to their 
understanding of response.  Government participants seem to associate response with efforts 
directed toward the community as a whole (e.g., “…we approach the emergency from a whole 
community aspect”, “we send our emergency first responders to provide assistance to the 
residents/businesses of the area”).  They also seemed to understand the concept of response in 
terms of its goal.  They used phrases such as “provide assistance”, “respond to the needs”, 
“handling the immediate issues”, “address the issues”, “attack the affects [sic] of the disaster by 
putting boots on the ground”, and “requesting the needed resources to handle the event” in their 
response to the question.  Many participants used similar phrases in their definitions implying 
that a) they think of response in terms of its goal, b) that the goal of response is to meet whatever 
needs result from the disaster’s impact, and c) that the impact of the disaster will result in some 
range of needs.  
Government participants defined response in terms of the general activity of deploying 
and managing resources and people.  Participants also seemed to identify their response 
“activity” as using, or participating within, specific incident management systems and 
organizational structures such as Emergency Operations Centers, the National Incident 
Management System, Incident Command System, Emergency Management Plan, and mutual aid 
as opposed to specific activities their organization was responsible for completing (e.g., security, 
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debris clearance, extinguishing fire, etc.).  Both the general activity and systems and structures 
identified by participants are directed toward the overall management of the incident.  
Government participants also appear to understand response as intimately linked to 
coordination.  Many participants referenced coordination in their definitions of response 
indicating that to them response meant “working together”, “bring in additional personnel, 
specialists and our partners in the surrounding community”, “provide assistance with police, fire, 
public works, and assist with utility services”, “coordinating mutual aid between agencies for 
delivery of personnel and/or equipment”.   
Based on the limited data available, it appears that nonprofit and government 
organizations conceive of response differently.  The data suggested that nonprofits think of 
response in terms of their specific activities while government thinks of response in terms of 
coordination, resources, systems, and structures.  Nonprofits seem to associate response with 
addressing basic needs of the individuals and households while government associate the concept 
with serving the community as a whole and managing the overall incident.  And, nonprofits seem 
to include both short-term and long-term activities within the rubric of response while 
government participants seemed to response with short-term activity only.  Based on this 
analysis, the following hypotheses regarding nonprofit and government organization 
conceptualizations of response might be tested through future research: 
H1: Nonprofit and government organizations utilize different criteria to define the 
concept of response. 
H2: Nonprofit and government organizations target their activities toward different social 
units (i.e., individuals and households, community wide, respectively).  
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H3: Nonprofit and government organizations are involved in different activities during 
the period after disasters that they understand as response. 
H4: Nonprofit and government organizations perceive the duration of response 
differently.  
Analysis of Data on Response Effectiveness 
The data seemed to suggest that nonprofits measure their effectiveness in three ways.  
Nonprofits seem to assess their organizational effectiveness in terms of general conditions, e.g., 
“people in need are being served…people are safe”, “when life sustaining needs are available to 
the community at a pre disaster availability”, “we don’t leave until the last roofing shingle is in 
place”, “individuals impacted begin transitioning into the recovery process”.  Nonprofits also 
appear to assess their effectiveness through the participation in/completion of activities.  For 
example, when asked directly how their organization assesses its effectiveness, participants 
replied,  “participate with long term recovery committees and monitor long term recovery 
efforts”, “we developed a response team that did inventories on all the resources we were 
receiving…”, “we monitor official reports…we maintain internal activity reports”, “distributions 
are completed as ordered by local/state emergency operations centers and FEMA”.  Finally, 
nonprofits tend to evaluate their effectiveness in terms of the feedback they receive, e.g.,  
“feedback from those with which we have had contact…feedback form the first responders”, 
“when the public feels that adequate resources are available”.  
With respect to government participants, they seem assess organizational effectiveness in 
terms of general conditions as opposed to things government organization do during response, 
how they do it, and what happened as a result.  Participants identified criteria they use to judge 
their organization’s effectiveness in terms of general conditions brought about after a disaster 
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such as “have we become ‘whole’ again”, “stabilize the jurisdiction affected by the disaster”, 
“return to a state of normalness”,  “signs of recovery  and responsiveness of the other public 
safety agencies within the affected area” and in terms of general things that do not come to 
fruition such as “safety-no personnel or citizens injured due to our actions”, “no injuries to 
responders”, “relief”, “protection of people and property”.  While government organizations do 
not seem to be using any specific, measurable, objective criteria to assess their effectiveness,  
there was indication that the effectiveness of their organization is being assessed.  Many 
government participants mentioned after action reviews and several others feedback from the 
community, or entities within it, as a means of assessing their effectiveness (e.g., “we usually 
have an after action meeting to discuss/review utilizing SWOT analysis approach”, “utilize an 
after action report”, “HOT Washes and After Action Reviews/Reports”, “by input from 
community and other public safety agencies”).  
The data revealed more similarities than differences in how each type of organization 
conceptualizes the effectiveness of their response efforts.  Both nonprofits and government 
agencies seem to evaluate their effectiveness based on communitywide, general conditions and 
feedback from others (as opposed to an self-assessment).  Nonprofits also evaluate whether they 
met the needs of individuals and whether they completed the activities they intended to in 
assessing organizational effectiveness while government organizations did not seem to evaluate 
anything their organization did/did not do or achieved/did not achieve through their response 
efforts.  Based on this analysis, the following hypotheses about nonprofit and government 
organization conceptualizations of effectiveness might be tested through future research: 
H1: Nonprofit and government organizations evaluate their organizational response 
effectiveness based on the presence/absence of communitywide, general conditions. 
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H2: Nonprofit and government organizations assess their organizational effectiveness 
primarily through feedback from external sources (e.g., feedback from responders, 
feedback from clients, after action review processes). 
H3: Nonprofit organizations evaluate whether they met the needs of individuals when 
assessing organizational effectiveness.  
H4: Government organizations do not evaluate whether they met the needs of individuals 
when assessing organizational effectiveness.  
H5: Nonprofit organizations evaluate whether they completed the activities they intended 
to in assessing organizational effectiveness. 
H6: Government organizations do not evaluate whether they completed the activities they 
intended to in assessing organizational effectiveness. 
Conclusion 
 The patterns that emerged are not enough to allow the researcher to offer even a tentative 
suggestion as to what the concepts of disaster, response, and effectiveness mean for nonprofit 
organizations or government organizations.  Nevertheless, the researcher did hone in on themes 
related to how nonprofits and government organizations perceive these concepts.  Table 1 
summarizes the themes evidenced in the data.  
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Table 1. Patterns from the government and nonprofit data. 
Concept Government Organizations Nonprofit Organizations 
Disaster  large scale impacts  
 overwhelmed local capability  
 overwhelmed local resources 
 no consensus  
Response  define response in terms of goal—to 
meet a range of disaster related needs  
 response involves coordination of 
government and deployment of 
personnel and resources as key 
activities 
 time span of response short 
 response directed toward community 
as a whole 
 define response in terms of the 
activities their organization does 
 all activities undertake are 
“response” 
 time span of response ranges 
from short to long 
 response directed toward 
individuals 
Effectiveness  assessment of effectiveness based on 
based on presence/absence of general 
conditions  
 assessment of effectiveness based on 
external feedback 
 assessment of effectiveness 
based on external feedback 
 assessment of effectiveness 
based on meeting the needs of 
individuals 
 assessment of effectiveness 
based on completion of activities 
 
The researcher also suggested a number of ways that nonprofit and government 
conceptualizations were different from one another.  Yet, while the researcher has tentatively 
suggested a number of patterns and differences may exist, she has done so through informal 
analysis of circumspect data and as a result the analysis should be viewed with utmost caution.    
 The lack of rich, detailed data discussed in Chapter Three significantly limited the 
analysis that could be conducted.  Furthermore, the researcher was unable to clarify with study 
participants whether her interpretation of their survey responses was what they intended.  Thus, 
the patterns and differences she identified may not have existed had a) better data been available 
for analysis and/or b) a formal and rigorous analysis of the data using an accepted analytical 
technique been conducted. 
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 The brief discussion in this chapter has not been shared as the culmination of an analytic 
process.  It has been shared because it provides some support for the notion that differences exist 
in how the two types of organizations view disaster response effectiveness as well as some 
indication of what might be found through further research on this topic.  By offering hypotheses 
for future testing on this topic, this study has contributed to the research literature.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
Contending with the aftermath of disasters is not a simple matter for impacted locations. 
One key complicating factor for response is that meeting the needs associated with these events 
often involves a range of groups from the government, nonprofit, and business sector.  While 
nonprofits have the longest history of involvement in dealing with disasters, government has had 
an ever increasing role over the last century.  Government assistance is typically directed toward 
serving the needs of the community at-large (e.g., clearing debris, providing security) while 
nonprofit assistance is typically directed at meeting the needs of individuals and households 
(e.g., providing food, water, shelter).  
While the involvement of both types of groups after a disaster is critical, the two types of 
groups have not been successful in coordinating their efforts.  Their failure to coordinate has 
resulted in significant criticism and a series of attempts throughout recent decades by 
government to develop coordination systems to address the coordination problem.  Yet, even 
recent attempts to unify the efforts of all of the groups involved after a disaster have met with 
limited success.  
Perhaps one reason why coordination systems have met with limited success is that they 
were devised without first examining how the various groups involved in the aftermath of 
disasters (in this case nonprofits and government agencies) conceptualize the events in which 
they are involved, their activities related to it, and how they assess the effectiveness of their 
response.  It seems intuitive that these issues ought to have a significant role in shaping the 
mechanisms we create to coordinate our efforts after disasters. 
The literature suggests that nonprofits and government agencies are different in 
fundamental ways.  Some of the ways in which these types of agencies differ day-to-day include 
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their mission and functions, organizational culture, power structure, and resources.  And, in 
disasters, these two types of groups are involved in different tasks, organize themselves 
differently, use different resources, and have different overall goals.  It is reasonable to think that 
because these types of organizations are so dissimilar they may perceive disasters, response, and 
effectiveness differently.   
This study attempted to explore how nonprofits and emergency management related 
government agencies conceptualized these key concepts.  The ultimate goal of the study was to 
contribute to emergency management theory and practice by identifying the extent to which 
nonprofits and government view these concepts similarly, articulating where differences exist, 
and suggesting the possible implications of their views for efforts to develop coordination 
systems for the aftermath of disasters.  
As has been discussed in the preceding chapters, the researcher was unable to explore her 
research question by fully and formally analyzing the data collected.  Thus, this study did not 
meet its goal. Yet, in examining the connection between the data issues observed and the chosen 
data collection method and the connection between the data issues observed an alternate method 
that would limit, if not eliminate, the data issues in the future, this study has made a contribution.  
In this case, an internet survey was not the best data collection approach to explore the research 
topic and in-depth, semi-structured interviews would have been a far better choice.  Future 
researchers investigating the meaning of disaster response effectiveness should bear in mind 
what was discovered through this research attempt.  
Exploration of the topic of disaster response effectiveness is critical for both practice and 
the emerging discipline of emergency management.  And, in light of this fact, the researcher 
made a superficial attempt to informally explore the data she had collected to see if there was 
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any indication of what these concepts meant to nonprofit and government organizations as well 
as whether any differences might exist in how each views the concepts.  The analysis revealed 
some patterns in nonprofit and government organization views and some evidence that 
differences in how each views the concepts may exist.  Based on the analysis, hypotheses of 
what future research might discover were offered. 
 It is this researcher’s hope that research is initiated again on the topic in the near future.  
A better understanding of how disaster response effectiveness is conceptualized by practitioners 
from both nonprofits and government would provide the information needed to compare each 
type of group’s views to current coordination systems to analyze their goodness-of-fit.  If a poor 
goodness-of-fit is found between current coordination systems and one or both types of groups 
views of disaster response effectiveness, then based on the information collected through future 
research a new coordination system could be devised.  Information about how each type of group 
perceives this topic could also be communicated in emergency management trainings so that 
representatives of both types of groups can better understand how the other works. 
Exploration of this topic is also central to the development of the emergency management 
discipline.  The concepts of disaster, response, and effectiveness remain undefined in the 
literature while still being central sensitizing concepts within the emerging discipline (Jensen, 
2010).  Research, such as that attempted by this study, stands to make significant contributions to 
the discipline by beginning to operationalize these concepts so that future students and 
researchers can begin their study with a clear understanding of the phenomena they are 
studying/about to study.  
 
 
  
63 
REFERENCES 
Alexander, D. (2005).  An interpretation of disaster in terms of changes in culture, society and 
international relations.  In R. W. Perry and E. L. Quarantelli (Eds.), What is a disaster? 
New answers to old questions (pp. 25-38).  Philadelphia, PA: Xlibris Corporation.  
Auf der Heide, E. (1989).  Disaster response: Principles of preparedness and coordination. St. 
Louis, MO: CV Mosby. 
Barton, H. A. (2005).  Disaster and collective stress: Origins of contemporary disaster research.  
In R. W. Perry and E. L. Quarantelli (Eds.), What is a disaster? New answers to old 
questions (pp. 125-151).  Philadelphia, PA: Xlibris Corporation.  
Bea, K., Halchin, E., Hogue, H., Kaiser, F., Love, N., McCarthy, X. F.,… Schwemle, B. (2006).   
Federal emergency management policy changes after Hurricane Katrina: A summary of 
statutory provisions.  CRS Report for Congress.  Congressional Research Service, The 
Library of Congress.  
Block, R. S. (2001).  A history of the discipline.  In J.S. Ott (Eds.), The nature of nonprofit sector 
(pp. 97-99).  Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Boris, T. E. & Steuerle, C. E. (2006a).  Nonprofits and government: Collaboration and conflict.  
Washington, D.C: The Urban Institute Press. 
Boris, T. E., & Steuerle, C. E. (2006b).  Charities’ response to disasters: Expectations and 
realities. After Katrina: Public expectation and charities’ response.  Emerging Issues in 
Philanthropy Seminar Series (pp. 1-4).  The Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations.  
The Urban Institute. 
  
64 
Brennan, M., Barnet, V. R., & Flint, G. C. (2007).  Community volunteers: The front line of 
disaster response.  The International Journal of Volunteer Administration, XXIV(4), 71-
77.  
Brinkley, D. (2006).  The great deluge: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans and the Mississippi 
Gulf Coast.  New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers.  
Britton, R. N. (2005).  What’s a word? Opening up the debate.  In R. W. Perry and E. L. 
Quarantelli (Eds.), What is a disaster? New answers to old questions (pp. 60-78).  
Philadelphia, PA: Xlibris Corporation. 
Buckle, Ph. (2005).  Disaster: Mandated definitions, local knowledge and complexity.  In R. W. 
Perry and E. L. Quarantelli (Eds.), What is a disaster? New answers to old questions (pp. 
173-200).  Philadelphia, PA: Xlibris Corporation. 
Canclini, Sh., Shannon, J., & Dillard, K. (2009).  A model for engaging the faith community in 
advance preparation for disaster.  Retrieved February 2, 2009 from 
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/(X(1)S(235abv455eioadymc2b2tp55))/Default.
aspx?t=320&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1. 
Comfort, K. L. (1988).  Managing disaster: Strategies and policy perspectives. Durham, NC: 
Duke Univ. Press.  
Comfort, K. L. (2006).  Cities at risk: Hurricane Katrina and the drowning of New Orleans.  
Urban Affairs Review, 41(4), 501-516.   
Coppola, P. D. (2011).  Introduction to international disaster management (2
nd
 ed.). Burlington, 
MA: Butterworth-Heineman.  
Cooper, Ch., & Block, R. (2006).  Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the failure of Homeland 
Security.  New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company.  
  
65 
Cutter, L. S. (2005).  Are we asking the right question?  In R. W. Perry and E. L. Quarantelli 
(Eds.), What is a disaster? New answers to old questions (pp. 39-48).  Philadelphia, PA: 
Xlibris Corporation.  
Dalal, J., Mohapatra, P., & Mitra, G. (2007).  Locating cyclone shelters: a case.  Disaster 
Prevention and Management, 16(2), 235-244. 
Davis, I. (1977).  Emergency Shelter.  Disasters, 1(1), 23-40. 
De Vita, J. C., Kramer, D. F., Eyster, L., Hall, S., Kehayova, P., & Triplett, T. (2008).  The role 
of faith-based and community organizations in providing relief and recovery services 
after hurricane Katrina and Rita.  Washington, D.C: The Urban Institute for U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services.  
Dillman, A. D., Smyth, D. J., & Christian, L. (2009).  Internet, mail, and mixed-mode surveys: 
The tailored design method (3
rd
ed.).  Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.  
Dombroski, M.,  Fischhoff, B., & Fischbeck, P. (2006).  Predicting emergency evacuation and 
sheltering behavior: A structured analytical approach.  Risk Analysis, 26(6), 1675-1688.  
Dombrowsky, W. (1995).  Again and again: Is disaster what we call “disaster”? Some conceptual 
notes on conceptualizing the object of disaster sociology.  International Journal of Mass 
Emergencies and Disasters, 13(3), 241-254. 
Dombrowsky, R. W. (2005).  Not every move is a step forward: A critique of David Alexander, 
Susan L. Cutter, Rohit Jigyasu and Neil Britton.  In R. W. Perry and E. L. Quarantelli 
(eds.), What is a disaster? New answers to old questions (pp. 79-96).  Philadelphia, PA: 
Xlibris Corporation.  
  
66 
Drabek, E. T., Harriet, L. T., Thomas, S. K., & Christopher R. A. (1981).  Managing 
multiorganizational emergency responses: Emergent search and rescue networks in natural 
disasters and remote area settings.  Boulder, Colorado: Institute of Behavioral Science, 
University of Colorado. 
Drabek, E. T. (1983).  Alternative patterns of decision-making in emergent disaster response 
networks.  International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 1(2), 277-305. 
Drabek, E. T. (1985).  Managing the emergency response.  Public Administration Review, 45, 
85-92.  
Dynes, R. (1970). Organized behavior in disaster.  Lexington.  Heath Lexington Books. 
Eisner, K. R. (2010). Building disaster resilient organizations in the non-government (NGO) 
sector.  Journal of Disaster Research, 5(5), 503-508.  
Egan, J. M., & Tischler, H. G. (2010).  The national voluntary organizations active in disaster 
relief and disaster assistance missions: An approach to better collaboration with the 
public sector in post-disaster operations.  Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy, 1(2), 
63-94. 
Fagnoni, C. (2006).  Hurricane Katrina and Rita: Provision of charitable assistance. United States 
Government Accountability Office, 297(6), 1-15.  
Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2011). National Disaster Recovery Framework: 
Strengthening Disaster Recovery for the Nation. Washington, D.C. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2008a). National Response Framework. Washington, 
D.C. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2008b). National Incident Management System. 
Washington, D.C. 
  
67 
Fischer, W. H. (1998). Response to disaster: Fact versus fiction & its perpetuation. The 
sociology of disaster. Maryland, MD: University Press of America. 
Gazley, B., & Brudney, L. J. (2005).  Volunteer involvement in local government after 
September 11: The continuing question of capacity. Public Administration Review, 65(2), 
131-142. 
Gajewski, S., Bell, H., Lein, L., & Angel J. R. (2010).  Complexity and instability: The response 
of nongovernmental organizations to the recovery of Hurricane Katrina survivors in a 
host community. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 40(2), 389-403.   
Gilbert, C. (1995).  Studying disaster: A review of the main conceptual tools.  International 
Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 13(3), 231-240. 
Hakim, C. (1987).  Research design: Strategies and choices in the design of social research. 
Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin. 
Hamilton, E. S. (2008).  Volunteers in disaster response.  Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & 
Trauma, 10(1), 621-632.  Retrieved May, 7, 2012 from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/J146v10n01_20 
Hewitt, K. (1995). Excluded perspectives in the social construction of disaster.  International 
Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 13(3), 317-340. 
Howitt, M. A., & Leonard, B. H. (2006).  Katrina and the core challenges of disaster response.  
The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 30(1), 215- 221. 
Hyer, K., Polivka-West, L., & Brown, L. (2007).  Nursing homes and assisted living facilities: 
planning and decision making for sheltering in place or evacuation.  Generations 31(4), 
29-33.  
  
68 
Jensen, J. (2010).  Emergency management theory: Unrecognized, underused, and 
underdeveloped.  In J. Hubbard (ed.), Integrating emergency management studies into 
higher education: Ideas, programs, and strategies (pp. 7-24).  Fairfax, VA: Public Entity 
Risk Institute. 
Kapucu, N. (2003).  Coordinating without hierarchy: Public - nonprofit partnerships. National 
Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA) Annual Conference, 
Public Administration: challenges of inequality and exclusion. Miami, FL. 
Kapucu, N. (2007).  Non-profit response to catastrophic disasters.  Disaster Prevention and 
Management, 16(4), 551-561. 
Kennedy, C. W., Brooks, T. M., & Vargo, M. S. ( 1969).  The police department in natural 
disaster operations (Report series 6).  Newark, DE: The Disaster Research Center, 
Department of Sociology, University of Delaware.  
Kreps, A. G. (1990).  The federal emergency management system in the United States: Past and 
present.  International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 8(3), 275-200. 
Kroll-Smith, J., & Couch, S. (1991).  What is disaster? An ecological symbolic approach to 
resolving the definitional debate.  International Journal of Mass Emergencies and 
Disasters, 9(3), 355-366. 
Lewis, R. G. (1988).  Management issues in emergency response.  In L. K. Comfort (Eds.), 
Managing disaster: Strategies and policy perspectives.  London and Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 
Majchrzak, A., Jarvenpaa, L. S., & Hollingshead, B. A. (2007).  Coordinating expertise among 
emergent groups responding to disasters.  Organization Science, 18(1), 147-161. 
  
69 
McQuaid, J., & Schleifstein, M. (2006).  Path of destruction: The devastation of New Orleans 
and the coming age of superstorms.  New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company.  
Maxwell, A. J. (2005).  Qualitative research design: An interactive approach (2
nd
ed.).  Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
Miller, A. D. (2009).  Disaster response.  Farmington Hill, MI: Greenhaven Press.  
Nigg, J., Barnshaw, J., & Torres, M. (2006).  Hurricane Katrina and the flooding of New 
Orleans: Emergent issues in sheltering and temporary housing.  The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 604, 113-128. 
National Research Council of the National Academes. (2006).  Facing hazards and disasters: 
Understanding human dimensions. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. 
Ott, S. (2001).  The Nature of the Nonprofit Sector (pp. 112-120).  Boulder, CO: Westview Press.  
Perry, W. R. (2007).  What is a disaster.  In H. Rodriguez, E. L. Quarantelli and R. R. Dynes 
(Eds.), Handbook of disaster research (pp. 1-15).  New York, NY: Springer Science + 
Business Media. 
Pipa, T. (2006).  Weathering the storm: the role of local nonprofits in the hurricane Katrina 
relief effort. Working Paper Series.  Washington, D.C.  Nonprofit Sector Research Fund 
(pp.1-48). 
Platt, H. R. (1999).  Disasters and democracy: The politics of extreme natural events.  
Washington, D.C.: Island Press.  
Popkin, S. R. (1978).  The American Red Cross response to disasters.  Mass Emergencies, 3(1), 
49-53. 
Porfiriev, B. (1995).  Disaster and disaster areas: Methodological issues of definition and 
delineation.  International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 13(3), 285-304. 
  
70 
Quarantelli, E., Dynes, R., & Haas, E. (1966).  Organizational functioning in disaster: A 
preliminary report (Working paper  #7).  Newark, DE: Disaster Research Center, 
University of Delaware.  
Quarantelli, E., & Dynes, R. (1977).  Different types of organizations in disaster responses and 
their operational problems (Preliminary Paper #41). Newark, DE: Disaster Research 
Center, University of Delaware.   
Quarantelli, E. (1982).  Sheltering and housing after major community disasters: case studies 
and general observations (Final project paper # 29).  Newark, DE: Disaster Research 
Center, University of Delaware.   
Quarantelli, E. (2000).  Emergencies, disasters and catastrofies are different phenomena 
(Preliminary Paper #304).  Newark, DE: Disaster Research Center, University of 
Delaware.   
Quarantelli, L. E. (2005).  A social science research agenda for the disasters of the 21
st
 century: 
Theoretical, methodological and empirical issues and their professional implementation.  
In R. W. Perry and E. L. Quarantelli (Eds.), What is a disaster?  New answers to old 
questions (pp. 79-96).  Philadelphia, PA: Xlibris Corporation. 
Ritchie, J., & Lewis, J. (Eds.). (2003). Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science 
students and researchers.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
Rubin, J. H., & Rubin, S. I. (2005).  Qualitative interviewing: The art of hearing data (2
nd
ed.). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.   
Rubin, C. (Eds.).  (2007). Emergency management: The American experience 1900-2006.  PERI. 
Salamon, M. L. (1999).  Scope and structure: The anatomy of America’s nonprofit sector.  In J. 
S. Ott (Eds.).  The nature of nonprofit sector (pp. 23-39).  Boulder, CO: Westview Press 
  
71 
Scanlon, J. (1999).  Emergent groups in established frameworks: Ottawa Carleton’s respones to 
the 1998 ice disaster.  Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 7(1), 30-37. 
Schneider, K. S. (2005). Administrative breakdowns in the governmental response to Hurricane 
Katrina.  Public Administrative Review, 65(5), 515-516.  
Schroeder, A., Wamsley, G., & Ward, R. (2001).  The evolution of emergency management in 
America:  From a painful past to a promising but uncertain future.  In A. Farazmand 
(Eds.),  Handbook of crisis and emergency management (pp. 357-418).  New York, NY: 
Marcel Dekker, Inc.  
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for the Response to Hurricane 
Katrina. (2006).  A failure of initiative: Final report of the Select Bipartisan Committee 
to Investigate the Preparation for the Response to Hurricane Kaaatrina. Wasgington, 
D.C.  
Simo, G., & Bies, A. (2007).  The role of nonprofits in disaster response: An expanded model of 
cross-sector collaboration.  Public Administration Review, 67(1), 125-142.  
Smith, G. (2011).  Planning for post-disaster recovery: A review of the United States disaster 
assistance framework. Fairfax, VA: Public Entity Risk Institute. 
Smith, H. M. (1978).  American religious organizations in disaster: A study of congregational 
response to disaster.  Mass Emergencies, 3(2), 133-142. 
Smith, D. (2005).  In the eyes of the beholder? Making sense of the system (s) of disaster (s).  In 
R. W. Perry and E. L. Quarantelli (Eds.), What is a disaster? New answers to old 
questions (pp. 201-236).  Philadelphia, PA: Xlibris Corporation. 
  
72 
Spillan, E. J. (2003).  An exploratory model for evaluating crisis events and managers’ concerns 
in non-profit organizations.  Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 11(4), 
160-169. 
Stallings, R. (2005).   Disaster, crisis, collective stress, and mass deprivation.  In R. W. Perry and 
E. L. Quarantelli (Eds.), What is a disaster? New answers to old questions (pp. 237-274).  
Philadelphia, PA: Xlibris Corporation. 
Sylves, R. (2008).  Disaster policy and politics.  Washington, DC: CQ Press 
Taylor, J. S., & Bogdan, R. (1998).  Introduction to qualitative research methods: A guidebook 
and resouce (3
rd
 ed.).  New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
Tierney, J. K., Lindell, K. M., & Perry, W. R. (2001).  Facing the unexpected: Disaster 
preparedness and response in the United States.  Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press.   
Torrey, C., Burke, M., Lee, M., Dey, A., Fussell, S., & Kiesler, S. (2007).  Connected giving: 
Ordinary people coordinating disaster relief on the Internet.  Proceedings of the 40th 
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences.  Carnegie Mellon University. 
van Heerden, I., & Byan, M. (2006).  The storm: What went wrong and why during hurricane 
Katrina: The inside story from one Louisiana scientist.  New York. NY: Penguin Group. 
Waugh, L. W., & Steib, G. (2006).  Collaboration and leadership for effective emergency 
management.  Public Administration Review, 66(1), 131-140. 
Waugh, L. W, & Tierney, K. (2007). Emergency management: Principles and practice for local 
government (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: ICMA. 
Wenger, D., Quarantelli, L. E., & Dynes, R. R. (1989).  Disaster analysis: Police and fire 
departments (final report #l).  Newark, DE: Disaster Research Center, University of 
Delaware.   
  
73 
Wolf, T. (1999).  Managing a nonprofit organization in the twenty-first century (pp. 17-41).  
New York, NY. Simon & Shutter Inc.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
74 
APPENDIX A: FOUR-STEP SAMPLING PROCESS  
First Step 
The first step was to determine locations that had experienced significant disasters in 
recent years.  Receipt of presidentially declared disaster (PDD) is one way of determining a 
given area (at the county level) has experienced a disaster.  While there are a number of criteria 
that are considered in the process of determining whether a PDD will be awarded, generally 
speaking, PDDs are awarded when a given location experiences impacts from an event that 
overwhelm its capacity as well as the capacity of the state in which it is located (FEMA, 2010).  
It was assumed that individuals who worked with organizations in areas that had experienced a 
number of disasters in recent years would be in the best position to provide rich, meaningful data 
regarding the topics under study in this research.  Based on this rationale, counties in states that 
received three or more PDDs between 2003 and 2012 were identified based on information 
available at the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s website.   
Second Step 
The second step was to identify all the counties within the state that received three or 
more PDDs that included access to the federal individual assistance program.  For counties to be 
granted access to the individual assistance program as part of a PDD additional criteria related to 
the impact of the event on individuals and households within the area have to be met (FEMA IS-
208a, 2010).  The rationale for this step was that the researcher assumed that nonprofits would be 
more likely to be engaged in the aftermath of a disaster, if individuals and families are 
significantly impacted; and, hence, have organizational representatives who could offer richer 
information.  
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This step resulted in an initial sample of 78 counties; however, most of the counties were 
from the State of Indiana – 58 counties.  As Indiana represented a large number of counties, 
researcher used a random sampling to select six counties from the list of 58.  The rationale for 
choosing six counties from Indiana was because six was the greatest number of counties that 
qualified for selection from any other state (i.e., Illinois) using the aforementioned process. 
Random written generator was used to identify starting point which is number 4.  Researcher 
selected every 10
th
 county on the list until 6 counties were selected from Indiana.  Thus, a sample 
of 26 counties resulted from the second step.   
Third Step 
The third step is intended to narrow the sample to geographical areas within counties that 
received PDDs where a range of individuals representing both nonprofits and government who 
could speak to their organization’s views of disaster response effectiveness would likely exist.  It 
was assumed that the largest urban area within the counties that received PDDs would likely 
have a combination of nonprofits and government entities that would have staff that could be 
contacted.  Outside of urban areas, the likelihood increases that representative of government 
entities (such as law enforcement and fire) and nonprofits would be volunteers and/or part-time, 
and/or hard to reach.  
Fourth Step 
The fourth step was to identify nonprofits and government organizations that were likely 
to be involved in disaster relief in the urban areas identified.  The types of government 
organizations selected were based on their recognition in the disaster literature as “first 
responders” or “the first line of defense” in emergencies and disaster within communities across 
the United States (Auf der Heide, 1989; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977).  These agencies include fire 
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and law enforcement.  In addition to these two types of organizations within the urban area, 
emergency management offices at the city level (if such an office existed) or at the county level 
were selected.  Emergency management offices were selected because the profession of 
emergency management is that which “coordinates and integrates all activities related to 
preparedness, response, mitigation and recovery” within jurisdictions (Quarantelli & Dynes, 
1977).This study will target one representative of each of these organizations within each county 
to include in the sample.  Specifically, the chief of police department, the chief of fire 
department and the local emergency manager will be invited for interviews. 
The researcher also invited 3 nonprofit representatives to participate in this research 
study.  Like in the case of the government organizations, the ideal nonprofit organizations to 
participate in this study would be those who actually participated in one of the recent disasters 
experienced in the area.  Thus, nonprofits were selected to be invited to participate in this 
research if the local news media or publicly available government incident briefings/after action 
reports reported their involvement.   
Using this four-step sampling process, six representatives from each of the 26 counties in 
the sample were invited for participation for a potential total of 156 potential participants (78 
nonprofit and 78 government representatives).  Specifically, the contact information for the 
individuals who were invited to participate were located from public resources including 
websites and phone books resulting in contact information for 151 potential participants (contact 
information for 5 potential participants could not be found).   
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APPENDIX B: COUNTIES THAT RECEIVED PDD BETWEEN 2003-2012 
Counties that received PDD that included federal  individual assistance program between 2003 and 
2012 
States Counties 
    
Year 
     
Alabama  
Jefferson 2012 2011       2007       2003 
Walker    2011 2010             2003 
Marshall   2011 2010             2003 
DeKalb   2011 2010             2003 
Baldwin               2005 2004 2003 
Washington   2011           2005 2004   
Subtotal:  6   
California 
Los Angeles          2008 2007   2005   2003 
Ventura           2007   2005   2003 
Subtotal: 2   
Florida  
Pasco 2012               2004 2003 
Wakulla 2012       2008     2005 2004   
Duval 2012       2008       2004   
Franklin 2012             2005 2004   
Volusia       2009 2008 2007     2004   
St. Lucie         2008     2005 2004   
Seminole         2008 2007     2004   
Subtotal: 7                     
Georgia 
Carroll       2009 2008       2004   
DeKalb       2009 2008       2004   
Fulton       2009 2008       2004   
Subtotal: 3                     
Illinois 
Winnebago     2010   2008 2007         
LaSalle         2008 2007     2004   
Subtotal: 2           
Indiana 
LaPorte    2009 2008   2005   
Dearborn     2008   2005 2004  
Hamilton     2008   2005 2004 2003 
Vanderburgh       2006 2005 2004  
Kosciusko    2009 2008   2005 2004  
Shelby     2008   2005 2004 2003 
Subtotal: 6                     
TOTAL :  26                     
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APPENDIX C: SURVEY INVITATION LETTER 
Note: This invitation was sent by e-mail. It looked as follows. 
 
From:  North Dakota State University 
Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management 
Dept. 2351 
P.O. Box 6050 
Fargo, ND 58108-6050 
(701) 231-5595 
Dear Sir or Madam 
North Dakota State University’s Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management needs 
your help for an exploratory study of the role of local agencies in disasters. Your agency has 
been selected for participation because your local jurisdiction has been impacted by a number of 
disasters in recent years and was likely involved in dealing with the impacts from the disaster. 
While much has been written about disasters and how communities cope with them, very little 
research has focused on the role of individual agencies in disasters and their views. This study 
intends to address the gap by asking you—someone we believe has relevant, recent experience 
dealing with disasters—what you think.  
I am eager to learn about your organization’s involvement disasters.  I hope that you will take a 
few minutes to complete the following survey on behalf of your agency at: 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/Local_Organization_Involvement_in_Disasters 
When you click the survey link, you will first encounter an information sheet providing 
additional information about this study.  Following the information sheet, you will find a short 
survey.  
 
It is expected that it will take approximately 20 minutes to complete the survey.  Should you 
need to exit the survey prior to completing it, you can return to your survey from the same 
computer any time prior to [X DATE] to finish by following the link above. 
Your participation in this survey and your survey responses will be kept confidential; your 
participation is voluntary; and, you may choose not to participate in the study anytime.  Should 
you have any questions, feel free to contact me by phone at 701-540-2682 or email at 
nazgul.borkosheva@my.ndsu.edu. You may also contact Dr. Jessica Jensen, who is assisting 
with this project, by phone at (701) 219-4293 or by email at ja.jensen@ndsu.edu. 
Thank you in advance for your participation in this research project.  
Sincerely, 
NazgulBorkosheva 
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APPENDIX D: INFORMATION SHEET AND SURVEY 
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APPENDIX E: REMINDER E-MAIL 
Note: The reminder was sent by e-mail.  It looked as follows. 
 
North Dakota State University 
Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management 
Dept. 2350 
P.O. Box 6050 
Fargo, ND 58108-6050 
 
Dear Sir or Madam,  
 
Approximately a week ago, a formal invitation to participate in an exploratory study on the role 
of local agencies in disaster was sent to you along with a link to a survey. To the best of our 
knowledge, your survey has not yet been completed. 
 
This survey represents an opportunity for you to educate students and faculty in emergency 
management higher education programs as well as agencies involved in dealing with disaster 
across the United States.  Please do not allow the chance to share your organization’s views to 
pass.  You can complete the survey about your organization’s role in disaster now at: 
 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/Local_Organization_Involvement_in_Disasters 
 
The survey should take about 15 minutes to complete and you can stop and return to the survey 
any time before December 21
st
 from the computer on which you started the survey. 
 
Should you have just completed the survey, thank you for your contribution to the emergency 
management community’s knowledge about disaster response.  If you have any questions, feel 
free to contact Nazgul Borkosheva at 701-540-2682 or email at 
nazgul.borkosheva@my.ndsu.edu. You may also contact Dr. Jessica Jensen, who is assisting 
with this project, by phone at (701) 219-4293 or by email at ja.jensen@ndsu.edu 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Nazgul Borkosheva 
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APPENDIX F: THANK YOU E-MAIL 
Note: The thank you was sent by e-mail.  It looked as follows. 
 
North Dakota State University 
Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management 
Dept. 2350 
P.O. Box 6050 
Fargo, ND 58108-6050 
 
Dear [Potential Participant Name] 
 
Thank you for your contribution to the emergency management community’s knowledge about 
disaster response. Each individual who completes the survey puts us one step closer to meeting 
the standards for scientific research. If you have any questions, feel free to contact Nazgul 
Borkosheva at 701-540-2682 or email at nazgul.borkosheva@my.ndsu.edu. You may also 
contact Dr. Jessica Jensen, who is assisting with this project, by phone at (701) 219-4293 or by 
email at ja.jensen@ndsu.edu 
 
Sincerely, 
 
NazgulBorkosheva 
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APPENDIX G: SECOND SURVEY INVITATION LETTER 
Note: This second invitation was sent by e-mail.  It looked as follows. 
 
From:  North Dakota State University 
Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management 
Dept. 2351 
P.O. Box 6050 
Fargo, ND 58108-6050 
(701) 231-5595 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
About two weeks ago, you were sent a link to a survey about your agency’s role in disasters.  To 
the best of my knowledge, you have not yet completed the survey.  
The participation of your agency is important, as the findings from this study will be used to 
educate the future emergency managers and other agencies involved in disasters. 
I am contacting you again because of the importance of your survey in helping get accurate 
results. Your agency has been selected for participation because your organization has 
experienced a number of hazard events in recent years and more than likely has been involved in 
disaster relief operations.  Your participation is needed to ensure that the survey results meet the 
scientific standards for research.  
I hope that you will take this last opportunity to participate in this research endeavor. I hope that 
you will take a few minutes to complete the following survey on behalf of your agency at: 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/Local_Organization_Involvement_in_Disasters 
Should you have any questions, feel free to contact me by phone at 701-540-2682 or email at 
nazgul.borkosheva@my.ndsu.edu. You may also contact Dr. Jessica Jensen, who is assisting 
with this project, by phone at (701) 219-4293 or by email at ja.jensen@ndsu.edu. 
Thank you in advance for your participation in this research project.  
Sincerely, 
Nazgul Borkosheva 
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APPENDIX H:  SECOND FOLLOW-UP E-MAIL 
Note: This follow-up was sent by e-mail.  It looked as follows. 
 
North Dakota State University 
Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management 
Dept. 2350 
P.O. Box 6050 
Fargo, ND 58108-6050 
 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
 
We are hoping you may be able to give about 15 minutes of your time to help us collect 
important information on disaster response by completing a short survey.  We plan to end this 
study next week, so we wanted to e-mail everyone who has not responded to make sure you had 
a chance to participate. 
 
Please do not allow the chance to share your organization’s views to pass.  You can complete the 
survey about your organization’s role in disaster now at: 
 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/Local_Organization_Involvement_in_Disasters 
 
The survey should take about 15 minutes to complete and you can stop and return to the survey 
any time before December 21
st
 from the computer on which you started the survey. 
 
If you have already completed the survey, we really appreciate your participation and thank you 
for your contribution to the emergency management community’s knowledge about disaster 
response. If you have any questions, feel free to contact Nazgul Borkosheva at701-540-2682 or 
email at nazgul.borkosheva@my.ndsu.edu. You may also contact Dr. Jessica Jensen, who is 
assisting with this project, by phone at (701) 219-4293 or by email at ja.jensen@ndsu.edu 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Nazgul Borkosheva 
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APPENDIX I: MODIFIED SURVEY 
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APPENDIX J: SECOND REVISED SURVEY INVITATION LETTER 
Note: This revised invitation was sent by E-mail.  It looked as follows. 
 
From:  North Dakota State University 
Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management 
Dept. 2351 
P.O. Box 6050 
Fargo, ND 58108-6050 
(701) 231-5595 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
About two weeks ago, you were sent a link to a short survey about your agency’s role in 
disasters. To the best of my knowledge, you have not yet completed the survey. 
   
The survey asks only general questions that solicit your thoughts and opinions. There are no 
technical questions and no formal training or expertise is necessary to respond. 
  
 The participation of your agency is critical to this research project. Thus, if you have a few 
minutes to complete the survey, I would be most grateful. 
  
 I hope that you will take this opportunity to participate in this research endeavor by completing 
the survey at:https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/Local_Organization_Involvement_in_Disasters 
Should you have just completed the survey, thank you for your contribution to the emergency 
management community’s knowledge about disaster response. 
  
 Should you have any questions, feel free to contact me by phone at 701-540-2682 or email 
atnazgul.borkosheva@my.ndsu.edu. You may also contact Dr. Jessica Jensen, who is assisting 
with this project, by phone at (701) 219-4293 or by email at ja.jensen@ndsu.edu. 
  
 Thank you in advance for your participation in this research project. 
   
Sincerely, 
   
Nazgul Borkosheva 
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APPENDIX K: DEFINITIONS OF DISASTER  
 Government  
Participant Responses 
1*  A minor disaster is an adverse event that may have impacted more than one jurisdiction, 
or may pose a threat of additional danger to public safety across several jurisdictions. 
Mutual aid is required from adjacent jurisdictions.  A major disaster is an adverse event 
that impacts numerous county jurisdictions.  Resources organic to jurisdictions of the 
county are insufficient and direct mutual aid is immediately required from either 
adjacent counties or state agencies. A catastrophic disaster is an event that has impacted 
severely on a major segment of the county involving many jurisdictions. Mutual aid is 
necessary from adjacent counties, state, federal and private sector resources for a 
prolonged period to meet both human response and recovery needs and reestablish the 
infrastructure. 
2*  When all of my "local" resources are or soon will be used or depleted.   75 +% of 
primary Law Enforcement, Fire and/or Medical units have been committed to a single 
event/incident.    The local hospital has been overrun. 
3*  Any situation that requires the coordination of city resources and outside resources and 
the opening of the City Emergency Operations Center for more than one operational 
period (12 hours). 
4  An event that overwhelms the resources assigned to mitigate the emergency 
 An event that uses the full spectrum of resources available to the City to maximum 
capacity 
 A disaster is defined as an event that uses the resources of the City, Region, State and 
Federal levels and is growing or expected to grow despite our efforts 
5  Unplanned 
 Disrupting 
6  Emergency situation beyond our resources  
 Not enough help 
7  Usually unexpected can build over weeks or happen very quickly - disasters result in 
damage 
 Disasters can create hazards 
 Disasters can be natural or manmade 
8  The first characteristic of a disaster that distinguish it from any other type of event(s) is 
an act of nature related to a weather event that causes injury or/and death to people, 
damage to property, and destruction in an area located in our jurisdiction. 
 The second characteristic of a disaster that distinguish it from any other type of event(s) 
is an industrial accident that causes chemical substance to be released in the city that 
causes injury and/or death to people, damage to property, and destruction in area located 
in our jurisdiction. 
 Another characteristic of a disaster that distinguish it from any other type of event(s) is a 
an act of terror designed to cause injury and/or death to people, damage to property, and 
destruction in an area located in our jurisdiction. 
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Participant  Responses 
9  Disaster most often is widespread and affects the entire population to some extent. 
 Disasters create a separation from normal daily routines and operations and cause a 
sense of panic and discord among those affected. 
10  An event which depletes the capability for a county to effectively respond to a disaster 
 An incident in which on scene incident management does not have the tools necessary to 
be successful 
11  Anything that affects our area 
 All disaster starts and ends local 
12  An unexpected natural or man-made event that exceeds the normal day-to-day 
emergency response capabilities of our community 
 Catastrophic event covering affecting a large group of people or property, whether 
physical or mental 
13  It has the magnitude to greatly impact the normal daily routine of our community, 
affects a vast number of our customers, or overwhelms our response capabilities. 
 It is an event that may be man-made or natural. 
14  Any event that involves mass casualties, or the potential of mass casualties beyond your 
normal capability 
 An event that requires more resources (hazmat, technical rescue EMS etc.) than are 
normally available.  All available resources from surrounding cities and county agencies 
could be required (State and local mutual aid agreements are activated) 
15  Overwhelms the department’s capabilities and resources 
 Forces the department to categorize its functions and only provide its Primary Mission 
Essential Functions. 
16  Volume and magnitude of calls for service 
 Resource needs are dramatically increased 
Nonprofits 
Participant Responses 
1*  We define two kinds.  On the one hand, you have local small events, such as an 
apartment building fire or flooding in a subdivision.  We can completely support these 
occurrences with our local resources.  On the other hand, you have national level events 
that are massive, such as Hurricane Sandy.  In both cases, a disaster is defined as any 
sudden occurrence that forces a person to be unexpectedly homeless and potentially 
without documents, medicine, clothes or food 
2*  We are the "guardians" over 300 plus children and are the main resources for 100 plus 
older adults through our core programs.  When a storm hits Florida we have the 
responsibility to ensure that our children and seniors are properly prepared, aware of 
resources and moved to a safe place if needed.  We coordinate with other non-profits in 
the area to make sure we are able to meet the needs of all vulnerable people in our 
community. 
3*  A disaster is an event or series of events of either natural or man-made causes that 
stretch the normal response capabilities of individuals and communities beyond their 
limits. 
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Participant   Responses  
4  Displaces individuals 
 Damages or destroys public or private property 
 Creates a gap in basic human needs being met 
5  Urgency of need with constrained transportation and storage at the point of disaster 
 Calls for support are routinely overblown and prioritization of distribution of assistance 
is often emotionally driven as opposed to actual need. 
6  A sudden event, such as an accident or a natural catastrophe 
 That causes great damage or loss of life 
 Can be unexpected 
7  Damages resulting from natural causes 
 Size and scope relative to a community population;  one house is a very small matter 
relative to 100 houses, etc. 
8  If the event effects more than 500 families that temporary or permanently displaced 
 500 families that temporary or permanently displaced 
 Special needs populations are 50% of the effected group and the under insured or not 
insured 
9  Disasters can be either man made (i.e. airplanes crash or terrorist attack) or the result of 
nature's violent storms such as hurricanes and tornados. 
 Disasters are often unexpected and usually affect a large segment of a local population. 
 Disasters often cause mass loss of property and human life. 
10  Manmade or natural disaster event that impacts all sectors in the community 
 Disruption due to emergencies 
 EMA, Business Continuity Plan enacted 
11  An abnormal event that requires the response to regain stability 
 Resulting in chaos requiring support to establish a normal 
12  A disaster would be an event that results in people's lives being turned upside down.  It 
somehow strips away their comfort and security and places them at risk. 
 A disaster is an event that results in unusual suffering, physical, mental, or spiritual. 
 Disasters do not have to be widespread.  It is important that we understand that 
personal disasters - for a child, the loss of a parent, or for a parent, the loss of a child - 
are often just devastating as natural disasters and the like. 
13  An entire community, town, or city is effected 
 People are without basic needs. 
14  A calamitous even 
 An event that causes loss of life, damage, or hardship 
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APPENDIX L: ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE ACTIVITIES  
Government 
Participant Responses 
1*  We activate our Emergency Operations Center and respond under that NIMS 
organizational structure. 
2*  Emergency Management may initially respond to the scene with resources as needed.  
And then would open an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to provide support to 
the scene in the form of requesting and tracking resources from outside the local 
jurisdictions.  Once the response is under control a damage assessment would be 
conducted in an attempt to gain Federal assistance.  After the damage assistance in 
complete we would switch to recovery planning. 
3*  Manages the Emergency Operations Center for the coordination of resources.    
Supervises the long-term recovery and unmet needs committees.    Manages the post 
disaster mitigation projects and funding. 
4  We respond as first responders as providers in the initial operational period. 
 We then proceed using the Operational P as a model to develop situational awareness 
to handle the emergency for extended operational periods. We approach the emergency 
from a whole community aspect. We activate the DOC's in each Department and open 
the City EOC to manage the emergency using the appropriate resources from each 
Governmental and Non-Governmental agency. 
5  Response and rescue 
 Assist with recovery 
6  Assistance 
 Coordination 
7  After the earthquakes in Haiti we participated in the evacuation of expatriated 
Americans from to our Airport.  This involved a large Incident Command System - 
over 10 thousand were evacuated 
 During hurricanes we use ICS  as well 
8  Once the disaster occurs we send in our emergency first responders to provide 
assistance to the residents/businesses of the area. The police department will send in 
officers and supervisors and the fire department will send in paramedics, fire engines, 
and rescue and recovery personnel and equipment and provide an assessment for 
activation of the Emergency Management Plan. Search and recovery of individuals are 
carried out. 
 Our Incident Command System (ICS) is activated and the various departments respond 
under our Emergency Management Agency to assist in the disaster area. The public 
works department responds with police and fire after an assessment has been made to 
restore the area. Debris is removed; utility companies come in to restore power, water, 
and gas service. Local, state, and federal agencies provide assistance for recovery 
9  This agency coordinates with local emergency response agencies to meet their needs to 
effectively respond to the disaster. 
 This agency coordinates with state and federal agencies to meet the needs of those 
affected by the disaster. 
10  Relief - food, clothing, shelter 
 Recovery- getting agencies back to predicate conditions 
  
102 
Participant                     Responses 
11  Working together every day 
 Within in 30 min 
12  We function as an emergency operations center, coordinating response and recovery. 
 We provide incident management teams 
13  We utilize standardized response models for our jurisdiction immediately. Then, 
depending on the variables of the incident, utilize appropriate automatic and mutual 
aid. These methods are utilized to address life safety until all life safety needs have 
been met. 
 Once life safety needs have been met, we return to normal emergency response 
platforms. We also enter into recovery and service operations assisting other city 
departments and customers. 
14  Fire, EMS, hazardous material, technical search & rescue etc. 
 We also are major participants in our county EMA Operations Center 
15  It upgrades it's response to attempt to overwhelm the incident and gain control 
immediately. 
 It automatically seeks out resources from other agencies and jurisdictions to include 
non-governmental organizations and faith based groups 
16  It models itself after its Federal (FEMA) and State (GEMA) partners to rapidly bring 
the incident into recovery, mitigation and COOP functions. 
 Dependent on the type of disaster 
 responds during a disaster and continues the efforts until the incident is mitigated or 
turned over to FEMA or other agencies that would take care of long term issues.  We 
prepare for typically 72 hours of support.  The response will include activating our 
Emergency Operations Center, creating a unified command system that involves any 
organization that has been effected or can aid in the recovery 
Nonprofits 
Participant Responses 
1*  We have volunteers on call 24/7/365.  For small events, they are dispatched 
through the 911 call center and go directly to the scene.  Depending on the size 
and need of the disaster, I might receive a call from the local EMA director and 
would then initiate a call-down of our phone tree to activate the appropriate 
volunteers.  I would establish the necessary facilities and let the community 
know what is available. 
2*  Prior to the storm we make contact with all vulnerable clients to develop 
disaster plan- evacuation plan if needed.  24 hours post storm we make contact 
with them again to ensure they are not in need of anything 
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Participant   Responses 
3*  We are members of local, community, state and national response organizations.  
We work with each of these entities to develop a coordinated plan of response 
that targets the needs and applies the available resources.  If resources are not 
available we work to develop them.    Specific things we have done in the past 
include in the short term  Providing food, water, clothing, financial resources, 
transportation, communications, counseling, referrals for housing.    In the long 
term we provided case management, financial resources for home repair 
4  Provides Sheltering 
 Provides feeding 
 Provides bulk distribution of supplies, provides follow-up client casework, 
assists in recovery process 
5  Attempts to identify areas of greatest need, prioritize distribution of food and 
water and report projected needs to national-level support elements. 
 Works to contact partners in impacted areas to determine their ability to support 
and inventory on-hand 
 Develops media releases to discuss needs, both food and financial. 
6  Providing additional food, water and services to people who have been 
impacted by an emergency or disaster.  During a catastrophic event, emergency 
food and disaster supplies are distributed from local points of distribution which 
may include churches, schools, businesses, parking lots and mobile vehicles.  
Response functions are initiated by an incident that causes major disruption to 
the surrounding community or the notification of a pending event. 
 We may also distribute food, water and disaster supplies to Food Banks in other 
parts of the State and the US. 
 We may also provide personnel services to Food Banks in affected areas. 
7  We use a protocol of contacts with people responsible for being eyes on the 
ground reporting to specific persons, and that begins a chain reaction of support 
and resources. 
8  Disasters are often characterized as response or recovery. We monitor response 
to address what's left to be done in the recovery phase 
 We find out what unmet needs are discovered 
 We may collect data, then request assistance from businesses or community. 
9  We offered the use of our facilities as a Command Center for Tornado Relief 
efforts to both civil/secular agencies (American Red Cross and FEMA) and 
Christian Disaster Relief Organizations (Alabama Baptist Disaster Relief and 
The Church of Christ Disaster Relief) 
 We also worked closely with local government authorities, local police and fire 
rescue departments along with the Mayor's Office here in Center Point. 
 We were also a housing and distribution center for victims of the disaster 
providing food, water, shelter, tarps and many of the daily hygiene needs of 
individuals. 
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Participant      Responses 
10  Mass Care 
 Individual and Family Recovery 
11  2-1-1 is available 24 hours/day to provide information and referral in disaster 
response and recovery. 
 Financial support for long term recovery efforts 
 Volunteer opportunities listed in volunteer match database 
12  Our congregation looks to support the first responders.  For them, the suffering 
and pain that they deal with on an ongoing basis can be overwhelming.  We are 
there to love and care for them.  We provide meals.  We pray for tem regularly 
and let them know that we are doing so.  The pastor of our church also serves as 
a volunteer chaplain. 
 We have paid to bring in help from outside our community to help in dealing 
with the pain and suffering. 
13  Utilize 2-1-1 
 Set up a volunteer center to handle volunteers and donations. 
14  We provide food, shelter, clothing, clean-up supplies, and grief counseling as 
we help people get back on their feet. 
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APPENDIX M: MEANINGS OF THE TERM RESPONSE 
Government 
Participant Responses 
1*  Response means handling the immediate issues and preparing for the extended 
response.  For example, our last declaration for disaster as a result of the floor 
included rescuing over 300 citizens from flooded homes and cars and then 
setting up command for housing, food, damage assessment, utilities and 
information. 
 Activating the Emergency Operations Center and working under the NIMS 
organizational structure with its assigned roles. 
2*  As is indicated in my response to the prior question, all of the topics listed are a 
"response" from my organization.  My job in a disaster is to respond to the 
NEEDS of not only the responders but also the impacted people of my 
jurisdiction as well as the elected officials. 
3*  First responders are considered those agencies tasked with rapid response to 
save lives and protect property.........we send a liaison to the incident 
commander to assist with the response phase if needed. 
4  Again we respond as first responders within the context of our Department 
Mission.  As the incident progresses as either planned or immediate we activate 
our next level of response be it DOC or EOC. 
5  Provide assistance to the community when services may not be available    
Assure safety of the residents during a disaster 
6  open EOC 
7  In the context of disaster, response is specifically geared to the disaster.  We 
bring in additional personnel, specialists and our partners in the surrounding 
community to address the issues generated by the disaster.  We engage daily in 
the business of public safety and law enforcement 
8  Our organization will arrive in a timely manner to provide assistance to our 
citizens, businesses and guest involved in a disaster and provide assistance with 
police, fire, public works, and assist with utility services coming into the area 
9  Response is an active approach to attack the affects of the disaster by putting 
boots on the ground; additionally, response is actually making contact with 
those directly affected by the disaster.  This agency's response is passive 
because the agency's personnel play a more active role behind the scenes and do 
not initially make direct contact with those affected by the disaster. 
10  Effectively managing resources to ensure on scene management is occurring. 
11  Every one working together 
12  Response to us may mean coordinating mutual aid between agencies for 
delivery of personnel and/or equipment.    Response may also mean deployment 
to a scene where we assist with Unified Command as well as logistics. 
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13  First, it is the performance of our normal operations. Operations which may be 
expanded continuously to meet the requirements of the demand.    2. It 
continues until our jurisdiction recovers to a normal daily routine. 
14  Dispatching fire/EMS personnel to the scene, establishing command and 
requesting the needed resources to handle the event.    In our department, 
"response" is used to describe emergency operations. 
15  The organizations responds in two elements:  1.Command and Control to 
implement strategic plans (IAPs) to take control of the incident and manage 
resources.    2. Task and Tactics:  to conduct operations based off of strategic 
planning 
16  The deployment of resources to mitigate the disaster.  The number and type of 
resources are dependent on the type of disaster and can change throughout the 
course of the response. 
Nonprofits 
Participant Responses 
1*  We would respond with shelter (cots, showers, heat, and ac), teams of client 
caseworkers, health and mental health professionals, disaster assessment teams, 
IT functionality, toiletry bags, even cleaning supplies. Our response would be 
provided to people that bridge between when a disaster occurs and when they 
have had time to figure out what to do, make other arrangements, allow 
insurance to kick in, whatever the case may be. 
2*  Response to us means preplanning and preparing our clients for the “what ifs” 
and then post disaster responding means ensuring their ongoing needs are being 
met, that they are safe, sheltered, and being fed. 
3*  The operative rule is be part of the solution not part of the problem. First of all, 
all response must be planned. There must be leadership and a framework to 
coordinate the response entities otherwise there is chaos at best and people get 
hurt at worst. The time to plan the disaster response is not after the fact. There 
must be ongoing, coordinated, collaborative plans that are practiced and 
exercised via training opportunities. 
4  Response for us is not life, property, or asset protection but meeting the 
immediate disaster caused needs of individuals through providing shelter and 
food. 
5  Transition to emergency operations which converts us from an agency support 
model to direct support to the community where needed. 
6  Distribution of food, water and supplies as ordered by local or state Emergency 
Operations Centers, or by FEMA. 
7  We have building teams, cleaning teams, chainsaw teams, counseling teams, 
and case management teams, etc. 
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8  Response term means fire and rescue, police, medical, power restoration, safe 
roads from debris and feeding and shelter 
9  Response to our disaster for our organization meant that we were willing to be 
open to almost every and all efforts that would help our church respond to the 
tremendous needs our community faced following the tornado disaster.  An 
example is our church opening our facilities as shelter for those left homeless 
after the tornado.  We also provided food and basic clothing needs for these 
victims.  All of this was done in cooperation with the Red Cross and the 
Alabama Baptist Disaster Relief Agency.  Another would be offering tree 
removal with Emergency Chain Saw crews which removed fallen trees from 
house tops, cars, and entrances to homes and driveways. 
10  The immediate phase of disaster where chaos ensues and requires outside 
resources. Begins at impact and morphs into recovery when chaos abates and 
rebuilding begins. 
11  Based on partnerships established with Red Cross and EMA's, United Way is 
responsive on the level appropriate to the disaster. 
12  Response would be things that we do that are directly related to the event. 
13  Ways to help...through funds, volunteers, and supplies 
14  Response: For most disaster situations, we have a 2 hour window of time for our 
staff to arrive at the scene of the emergency. That is what our "response" is. 
 
 
 
 108 
APPENDIX N: ASSESSING ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE EFFECTIVENESS  
Government 
Participant Responses 
1*  Have we become "whole" again.  Have I fixed as many of the problems caused 
by the disaster as is possible. 
2*  The effectiveness of our organization has increased dramatically over the past 
five years with the numerous disasters we have had to face and the preparedness 
that we go through as a community.  On a scale of 1-10, we would rate a 8. 
3*  We usually have an after action meeting to discuss/review utilizing a SWOT 
analysis approach. 
4  We know if the initial response has been effective based on the situational 
awareness and battle rhythm of the incident. If a fire is extinguished using our 
resources then we know the effort has been effective. if the fire continues to 
grow beyond the objectives of the IC then we know the response needs to be 
enhanced with more robust resources or strategy needs to change. 
 At the DOC and EOC level we use the Planing P to assist with determining if 
incident objectives are being met in a timely, efficient manner. 
5  Injuries or loss of life 
 What the increase in criminal activity was during the event 
6  Responder coordination 
 Relief 
7  Protection of people and property  During hurricanes, we assist int the 
evacuation of people to shelters and prevent looters from taking advantage of 
the situation - it has been effective if our officers return safely, the criminals are 
incarcerated and there is minimal loss of property due to theft. 
 Prior to the disaster, mitigation processes have been put in play.  Citizens 
prepare for the approaching storm and heed the warning to evacuate.  We are 
successful if no citizens are lost in the process.  One is too many. 
8  Our agency utilize an action report that we utilize to evaluate our effectiveness. 
We work with our EMA to gauge our effectiveness. 
 We document the resources that are utilized during the event and measure our 
results. We work with the state and federal agencies that assist with measuring 
our effectiveness. 
9  The most important factor in any disaster is ensuring life safety for response 
agencies and the public. 
 The next important factor is to stabilize the jurisdiction affected by the disaster 
to a point where recovery can begin. 
10  After action review 
 Effective communication and coordination 
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11  By input from community and other public safety agencies 
 Staying in contact with everyone 
12  Signs of recovery and responsiveness of the other public safety agencies within 
the affected area 
 Feedback from citizens via verbal, written, social and news media.  Feedback 
from elected officials is huge. 
13  We return to a state of normalness experienced prior to the disaster. 
 All objectives of the incident action plan have been met. 
14  Safety - no personnel or citizens injured due to our actions. 
 A positive outcome dealing with life and property conservation 
15  The organization maintains a situational awareness to provide updates to 
command on the progress made during an incident via communications such as 
Plans and Operations Meetings, Real Time Field Reporting, Web EOC, etc. 
 Continuous evaluation and analysis of progress to ensure that the IAP is 
working 
 HOT Washes and After Action Reviews/Reports 
16  Mitigation of the event 
 No injuries to responders 
 After -action report in accordance with HSEEP. 
Nonprofits 
Participant Responses 
1*  Clients can voluntarily fill out surveys after things have settled for them.  We 
also track figures, such as how many became homeless or were able to retain 
their employment as the result of our support. 
2*  Our funders dictate to us the protocols and our funding is impacted if we do not 
follow the protocols.  There has not been any concern in the past but luckily our 
area has not suffered a direct hit of a storm in years. 
3*  We are very effective 
4  Client surveys 
 Fire rescue relationship 
5  People in need are being served. 
 People are safe 
6  Feedback from those with which we have had contact 
 Feedback from the first responders 
7  Participate with Long Term Recovery Committees and monitor long term 
recovery efforts 
 Utilization of volunteer match for disaster related activity 
 Analyze 2-1-1 disaster related call service 
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8  When life sustaining needs are available to the community at a pre disaster 
availability 
 when the public feels that adequate resources are available to help them on the 
road to recovery. 
9  We developed a Response Team that did inventories on all the resources we 
were receiving both locally and across the U.S.  We were overwhelmed at first 
with the sheer amount of resources that came in.  By inventorying the supplies 
we were able to keep an accurate accounting of supplies received and supplies 
distributed. 
 We had teams of Chaplains and church volunteers that went into the affected 
areas offering assistance, gathering information and sharing prayer, consolation 
and counseling.  We thus had registered the names of individuals, addresses, 
etc., which enabled us to follow up with these individuals at a later date. 
 Simply the numerous outlets and agencies as well as local citizens who 
recognized our church for our contributions in the disaster relief efforts, (i.e. 
local news media covered our response, the Alabama Baptist State Convention 
Executive Director came to our facilities and commended and contributed to our 
response efforts, local agencies such as the Birmingham Baptist Association did 
the same as did the Mayor's office). 
10  We become part of the Long Term Recovery Group who will communicated 
with and through local Emergency Management daily via conference calls 
 We monitor official reports 
 We maintain internal activity reports 
11  We work exclusively with the community organizations, and other responder 
organizations.  We never just drop in and start working out of the local context 
 We don't leave until the last roofing shingle is in place 
12  Distributions are completed as ordered by local/state Emergency Operations 
Centers and FEMA. 
 Critical services to our Partner Agencies resume. 
13  Distribution of meals compared to disaster foot print. 
14  All individuals in need of meals as a result of the disaster have meals provided 
for them.  
 All individuals seeking shelter in response to the disaster have a temporary 
place to stay. 
 Individuals impacted begin transitioning into the recovery process. 
 
 
